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Abstract
The forces at play in reconstruction operations are a complex system of time
phased interlocking cause and effect relationships that are not thoroughly understood. A
model capable of capturing the general dynamics involved in post-conflict reconstruction
would provide insight to decision makers regarding potential policy alternatives. This
research effort demonstrates the viability of using systems dynamics modeling techniques
to simulate the establishment of public order and safety in a post-conflict reconstruction
operation (Phase IV operations). A high level generic framework is developed that can be
used as a general template for modeling post-conflict reconstruction. It is then
demonstrated with a notional test case based on the OIF AOR.
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MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

I. Introduction

Background
The term post-conflict reconstruction denotes the process of putting the pieces of
civil society back together after a conflict. It includes the rebuilding of both physical
infrastructure and the rebuilding of the intangible socioeconomic institutions that make
civilized society possible (Harme and Sullivan,2002:89). The establishment of the rule of
law, good governance, and social and economic well being falls under the purview of
post-conflict reconstruction (Harme and Sullivan, 2002:89). Information on post-conflict
reconstruction spans the literature on peacekeeping, peace enforcement, nation building,
and stability operations (Dobbins, McGinn, Crane, Jones, Lal, Rathmell, Swanger, and
Timilsina, 2003:1).
The United States launched its first large scale efforts at post-conflict
reconstruction in Germany and Japan following the Second World War (Dobbins et al.,
2003:xiii). The result of the efforts of the U.S. and its allies were stable and prosperous
democracies in both Germany and Japan. The success of these operations demonstrated
that post-conflict reconstruction could succeed, that democracy was transferable, and that
military forces could be used to underpin rapid, fundamental, and enduring societal
change (Dobbins et al., 2003:xiii).
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Since the end of the Cold War the United States has become involved in
increasingly ambitious post-conflict reconstructions (Dobbins et al., 2003:xv). The rise
of international terrorism has highlighted the potential threat to U.S. security posed by
failed or failing states (Harme and Sullivan, 2002:85). Failed states can be used as
sanctuaries for terrorists (Harme and Sullivan, 2002:85); it is a stated national security
objective of the United States to “eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and havens” (National
Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2003:22). One way that the international
community can deny terrorists these safe havens is by intervening and reconstructing an
effective government in the previously ungoverned territory of a failed state (Harme and
Sullivan, 2002:88).
Success in a post-conflict reconstruction depends on nearly simultaneous
progress in the four “pillars” of post-conflict reconstruction: (1) security, (2) justice and
reconciliation, (3) social and economic well-being, and (4) governance and participation
(Feil, 2002:98). Progress in all four of these areas is inextricably linked (Feil, 2002:98).
If progress in one area is to endure it must be accompanied by progress in the other areas.
Nevertheless, “security, which encompasses collective and individual security to the
citizenry” and those establishing security, “is the foundation on which success in the
other issue areas rests” (Feil, 2002:98).
The establishment of security in a post-conflict environment is of critical
importance to the success of a reconstruction operation (Play to Win, 2003:4). When the
international community intervenes in a post-conflict environment it is often the security
vacuum at the heart of the situation that acted as the catalyst for the intervention (Play to
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Win, 2003:10). The term security “addresses all aspects of public safety, particularly the
establishment of a safe and secure environment and the development of legitimate and
stable security institutions” (Play to Win, 2003:10).
Recently the United States has become involved in large scale post-conflict
reconstructions in both Afghanistan and Iraq. These operations face the daunting task of
simultaneously addressing the four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction and, in both
countries, the establishment of security has emerged as a critical issue (Grymes,
2003:1;United Nations/World Bank, 2003:3). For instance, in Afghanistan establishing
security is “the overriding and supreme requirement for continued progress towards
stability” (Grymes, 2003:1). Currently, the government of Afghanistan cannot provide its
population with basic protections and services that the government of a modern nationstate is expected to provide (Grymes, 2003:7). A tool that could provide insight to
decision makers about how to employ their resources more effectively to successfully
establish security could save money and lives.

Problem Statement
The forces at play in a post-conflict reconstruction are complex, and do not fall
under the purview of any single academic discipline. The study of post-conflict
reconstruction is inherently interdisciplinary; military theorists, economists, sociologists,
relief organization personnel, political scientists, and operations research analysts have all
made contributions to the understanding of post-conflict reconstruction. Unfortunately,
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all of the interlocking cause and effect relationships involved in a post-conflict
reconstruction are not thoroughly understood.
A model capable of capturing the dynamics involved in a post-conflict
reconstruction would be helpful in providing insight to decision makers about what
policies should be followed to produce a desirable outcome to a post-conflict
reconstruction. It could help countries that have been shattered by war to put the pieces
of civil society back into place, while saving valuable resources such as money and, more
importantly, lives. A first step towards developing a comprehensive post-conflict
reconstruction model would be the development of a model that can simulate the initial
establishment of security in a post-conflict reconstruction.
The overall goal of this research effort was to demonstrate the viability of using
system dynamics modeling techniques to simulate post-conflict reconstruction. This was
done by constructing a general model for simulating the initial establishment of security
in a post-conflict reconstruction, and then by applying the general model to a notional
scenario and analyzing the results.

Methodology
System dynamics models represent social systems “as flow rates and
accumulations linked by information feedback loops involving delays and non-linear
relationships. Computer simulation is then the means of inferring the time evolutionary
dynamics endogenously created by such system structures” (Lane, 1997:1037). This
research effort explored the previous literature relevant to the simulation of post-conflict
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reconstruction with such a model. This includes previous research that has been
conducted on post-conflict reconstruction itself and on systems dynamics.
The exploration of the previous research on post-conflict reconstruction focused
on studies that have tried to identify or explain the relationships between the influential
factors that interact in such an operation. The systems dynamics literature was explored
for research that provides insight into how apt a system dynamics model is for the
simulation of post-conflict reconstruction.
Based on the previous research done into post-conflict reconstruction, the
influential factors involved in a post-conflict reconstruction are identified and the
functional forms of their interactions are suggested. These factors and functional
relationships are then used in the creation of a general systems dynamics model for
simulating post-conflict reconstruction. This model was then applied to a notional
scenario based on Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Summary
This introduction explained the relevance of this research effort and outlined its
approach. The relevant literature on nation building and systems dynamics modeling is
presented in Chapter II. The methodology for the construction of a general post-conflict
reconstruction model is discussed in Chapter III. The general model is then applied to a
notional scenario in Chapter IV. Conclusions are drawn and areas for further research are
identified in Chapter V.
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II. Literature Review

Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the literature relevant to the development of
a post-conflict reconstruction model. Concepts of systems dynamics are first introduced.
Various sources are then summarized to provide insight into the relationships underlying
the establishment of security in a post-conflict reconstruction.

Systems Dynamics Literature
As was mentioned in the first chapter, system dynamics models represent social
systems as webs of level values and rate of change interconnected by non-linear
relationships, information feedback loops, and time delays (Lane, 1997:1037). System
dynamics modelers build these interconnected webs of level values (i.e., state variables)
and flow rates (i.e., rates of change) to represent how the various parts of complex
systems interact with each other. Once the model is built to represent the complex
system of interest, computer simulation is used as “the means of inferring the time
evolutionary dynamics endogenously created by such system structures” (Lane,
1997:1037).
The study of system dynamics owes a great deal to the work of J. W. Forrester. In
1961 Forrester effectively founded the study of system dynamics with the publishing of
his seminal work Industrial Dynamics. In it, Forrester explained how the operations of a
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firm can be simulated as a system of level values and flow rates connected by
information feedback loops (Forrester, 1961:67).
In Industrial Dynamics Forrester used a generic multistage distribution system as
the subject of his example model. The multistage distribution system was modeled as a
factory, a factory warehouse, a distribution center, and a retail outlet. Customers order
goods at the retail outlet and the goods are delivered in one week. Replacement stock
orders from the retail outlet to the distribution center take three and one-half weeks to
process at the retail outlet, one week to fill at the distribution center, and one week to be
shipped from the distribution center to the retail outlet. Replacement orders from the
distribution center to the factory warehouse take two and one-half weeks to process at the
distribution center one week to fill at the factory warehouse and two weeks to ship to the
distribution center. It takes one week to process an order from the factory warehouse to
the factory and six weeks to change the factory’s production rate (Forrester, 1961:22).
This system is illustrated by figure 2.1.
Forrester used this model to simulate how a multistage distribution system
operates. He demonstrated that the delays and information feedback loops in the system
cause long order backlogs and inefficiencies if a mild fluctuation in the customer demand
of plus or minus 10% from fall to spring is introduced (Forrester, 1961:26).
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Figure 2.1. Systems Dynamics Model of a Multistage Distribution system

By simulating the operations of a distribution system in this way Forrester was
able to demonstrate that the time phased interactions and non-linear relationships that
often exist in information feedback loop systems can lead to counter-intuitive behavior
that can be difficult to manage. In some instances, policies that are implemented based
on conventional wisdom or their intuitive appeal may end up producing the opposite of
their intended result. Industrial Dynamics suggested how these systems can be simulated
so that better policies can be developed.
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In 1969 Forrester expanded the scope of system dynamics with his book Urban
Dynamics where he applied the tools of system dynamics to the problem of urban
stagnation (Forrester, 1969:1). In Urban Dynamics Forrester simulated how a city
proceeds through stages of rejuvenation and decay in order to determine what policies
could be followed to encourage revitalization and prevent economic stagnation (Forrester,
1969:1). To accomplish this Forrester structured his model as a system where urban
components of industry, housing, and people interact and develop over time (Forrester,
1969:1). This model is far more complex than the relatively simple model employed in
Industrial Dynamics. A full discussion of Forrester’s urban dynamics model is beyond
the scope of this paper. However, it is important to note what Forrester was able to
achieve with his urban dynamics model.
Using the building blocks of level values, flow rates, information feedback loops,
and time delays introduced in Industrial Dynamics, Forrester was able to create a model
of a generic city that was capable of endogenously simulating the dynamics of urban
decay and revival (Forrester,1969:129 and Lane,1997:1255). With his model, Forrester
was able to experiment with various policies and determine what types of programs
tended to encourage urban renewal. Forrester’s model provides “powerful insights into
the structural causes behind urban stagnation” (Lane,1997:1255). Some critics found
some of Forrester’s conclusions to be counter-intuitive (Lane,1997:1255). For example,
Forrester’s conclusion that, instead of rejuvenating depressed inner cities, a low-cost
housing construction program actually contributes to urban decline (Forrester, 1969:67).
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With the publishing of World Dynamics in 1971, Forrester again demonstrated the
versatility and usefulness of the system dynamics methodology, by using it to simulate
the interactions and “mutual interplay between [the world’s] demographic, industrial, and
agricultural subsystems” (Forrester, 1971:vii). Before World Dynamics was published
most studies on the sustainability of world development focused on the isolated effects of
each of the subsystems (Forrester, 1971:vii). World Dynamics used the modeling
techniques of system dynamics to study the interaction of these subsystems to ascertain
their overall effects on each other, demonstrating that system dynamics was a useful tool
at synthesizing disparate fields of study into a single model that taken as a whole is
greater than the sum of its subsystems (Forrester, 1971: vii).
Forrester’s work in Urban Dynamics and World Dynamics is highlighted here
because it illustrates the range of problems to which system dynamics techniques may be
successfully applied. System dynamics methods are designed to allow for the simulation
of complex systems. These methods are uniquely suited for the simulation of complex
social systems like the functioning of a government or the dynamics of international
development (Forrester,1969:107). Complex social systems are characterized by their
“interlocking structure of feedback loops” (Forrester,1969:107). They typically are of
higher order, nonlinear, contain both positive and negative feedback loops, and “bring
together many factors which, by quirks of history, have been compartmentalized into
isolated intellectual fields” (Forrester,1969:109).
Recently, systems dynamics methods have been applied to the military sphere
through the Strategic Management System (STRATMAS), a program that uses systems
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dynamics and other models to improve command and control (Woodcock, 2003:111).
Woodcock and other researchers involved in the development of STRATMAS have
identified the need for “more integrated functional and coordinated command processes,”
and have proposed the use of validated models in support of “rapid situation assessment
and proactive command and control and crisis management” (Christensson and
Woodcock,2002:2).
In a recent paper entitled “Perceptual and Societal Dynamical Models for
Compliance and Peace Building” Woodcock argues that “Neuro-Archeology” can be
used to “provide insights that may facilitate the process of compliance and peace
building” (Woodcock, 2003:112). “Neuro-Archeology” is defined as the process of
discovering “artifacts of the activities of the human brain . . . in the writing or other
activities produced by the individual concerned” and using these artifacts to reconstruct
the internal dynamics and models that may have been responsible for their creation
(Woodcock, 2003:112). Trotsky’s description of the Russian Revolutions of 1917 is then
used to construct a systems dynamics model of the overthrow of the Tsarist government
in Russia (2003:128). Woodcock concludes that such models could help provide
understanding of how individuals perceive “the complex problems with which they are
faced”, and that such understanding could support the process of compliance and peace
building “in an uncertain, complex and dangerous world” (2003:135).
Like the process of world development, urban renewal, and revolution in Tsarist
Russia, a post-conflict reconstruction takes place in a complex evolving social system.
There are various fields of study from military theory, demographics, economics,
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political science, and sociology, among others, that make predictions about post-conflict
reconstructions and their environments. A post-conflict reconstruction model would have
to be populated with data from all these fields of study. A mathematical model capable
of capturing the dynamics of a post-conflict reconstruction operation should have the
characteristics of a systems dynamics model. It should be nonlinear and higher order,
contain both positive and negative feedback loops, and bring together disparate
intellectual fields. Post-conflict reconstruction operations are conducted at the edge of
anarchy, where the traditional assumptions of economics and political science may not
apply. In the past, systems dynamics has been used to successfully model social systems
that take place at the nexus of economics, political science, and sociology. If the proper
relationships are captured, a system dynamics model can be used to simulate a post
conflict-reconstruction.

Post-Conflict Reconstruction Literature
Since World War II the United States has become involved in close to a dozen
post-conflict reconstruction operations (Dobbins et al., 2003:2) These operations range
from the larger projects of postwar Germany, Austria, and Japan to the shorter and more
limited operations in Lebanon, Grenada, and Panama. Over the years these operations,
and others like them, have been studied providing key lessons (Dobbins et al., 2003:2).
One of the lessons that has been learned is that security must be established for a
post-conflict reconstruction operation to be successful. “Play to Win,” the final report of
the Bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, concluded that security is
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essential to post-conflict reconstruction saying that while “every case is different, there is
one constant—if security needs are not met, both the peace in a given country and the
intervention intended to promote it are doomed to fail” (p. 4). In the article “Democracy
by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building,” von Hippel explains that
reestablishing security in a country is one of the fundamental elements required in
rebuilding and democratizing states after an intervention (p 106). Even if an intervention
is able to successfully strengthen democratic institutions in a state, these “strengthened
democratic institutions will not endure unless the state maintains the legal monopoly on
force” (von Hippel, 2000:106).
The term security refers to the need to secure “the lives of citizens from
immediate and large-scale violence,” the need to secure the lives of “international
assistors,” and the need to “restore the state’s ability to maintain territorial integrity”
(Play to Win, 2003:10). This encompasses “all aspects of public safety, particularly the
establishment of a safe and secure environment and the development of legitimate and
stable security institutions” (Play to Win, 2003:10). For the purposes of this study, a
military operation aimed at bringing about this security is a stability operation.
Integral to the establishment of a safe and secure environment and to the
development of legitimate and stable security institutions is the establishment of the rule
of law. In 2000, the commander of the Stabilization Force in Bosnia commissioned the
U.S. Army Peace Keeping Institute to prepare a report on the lessons learned in Bosnia
on the establishment of the rule of law. The report concluded that for the rule of law to
take hold in a post-conflict situation three transitions must take place: the transition “from

13

disorder to order”, the transition “from a hostile to a permissive environment”, and the
transition “from institutional incapacity to capacity” (Mac Warner, Mike Dziedzic, Tyler
Randolph, Peter Garcia, Susan Remis Silver, and Sandy Levinson, 2000:xi) .
The first transition, “from disorder to order” essentially refers to the cessation of
large scale hostilities (Warner et al.., 2000:xi). Few gains can be made in establishing the
rule of law while widespread combat operations are still taking place. The task of
making this transition primarily falls on the shoulders of the military (Warner et al.,
2000:xi).
The second transition, “from a hostile to a permissive environment” refers to the
task of “shaping the environment so that the rule of law can take root” (Warner et al.,
2000:xi) . This means ensuring that the current power structures in the state are
conducive to the rule of law. “Shaping the environment” is achieved through a
combination of military operations conducted in concert with wider civilian political
reforms (Warner et al., 2000:xi). For instance, if organized crime has taken root and is
asserting a strong influence on political power in a state, dismantling that organized crime
power structure would be essential to creating an environment in which the rule of law
can be established (Warner et al.,2000:xi).
The third transition, “from institutional incapacity to capacity” refers to the
development of legitimate and secure security institutions, such as police, courts, prisons,
border guards, and a civil defense force (Warner et al.,2000:xi). If the institutional
capacity to bring criminals to justice while protecting human rights does not exist then
there can be no sense of personal safety for the population at large (Perito 2003:3). The
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development of these security institutions is essential for the protection of the
fundamental rights that make a free and fair civil society possible. Without a sense of
personal safety, refugees and internally displaced persons will not return home, former
combatants will not lay down their arms and reintegrate into civilian life, farmers and
merchants will not engage in food production or business activity, and parents will not
send their children to school or seek economic opportunity (Play to Win, 2000:10).
In order to illuminate some of the underlying relationships involved in the
establishment of security in a post-conflict reconstruction, this research effort drew on
literature and sources from a wide variety of disciplines. In addition to the sources
previously discussed, sources on law enforcement, economics, and the mechanics of
insurgency and counter-insurgency were consulted.
Information on law enforcement and counter-insurgency operations in a postconflict environment was drawn from U.S. military doctrine on operations other than war
and peace operations, Department of Defense Joint Publications 3-07 and 3-07.3
respectively. Papers by Neumeyer from the Journal of Peace Research and Morcan and
Reece from the National Bureau of Economic Research were consulted for information
on the relationship between crime and the economy.
Information on the economics of post-conflict reconstruction was drawn from a
variety of sources. The World Bank policy research report entitled Breaking the Conflict
Trap: Civil War and Development Policy was indispensable as a general reference on
civil war and its aftermath. United Nations resolution 53/92 entitled “The Causes of
Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa”
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was a useful source on the approach of the United Nations to post-conflict reconstruction.
Dalgaard and Hansen’s paper “On Aid, Growth and Good Policies” provided insight on
the influential factors for economic growth in low income and post-conflict countries.
The 2003 Center for Strategic and International Studies paper by Harme and others on
post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq was useful as it identified critical infrastructures and
essential services in post-conflict Iraq. Blanchard’s book on macroeconomics and
Okun’s paper on economic growth and unemployment provided insight on the
relationship between economic growth and unemployment rates.
Information on the mechanics of insurgency and counter-insurgency was drawn
from the concluding report of the Challenges Project and a paper by Epstein and others
on “Modeling Civil Violence: An Agent-Based Computational Approach.” The
Challenges Project was a five year study of multinational peace operation initiated by the
Swedish National Defense College, and was useful as a source on measures of
effectiveness in peace operations. The paper by Epstein and others presented an agent
based model for civil violence and was indispensable as a source on the mechanics of
insurgency and counter-insurgency.

Summary
Systems dynamics models represent complex social systems as webs of time
phased interconnected level and rate variables. This type of model is well suited for
simulating the complex and interconnected environment in which post-conflict
reconstructions takes place. The literature relevant to post-conflict reconstruction was
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surveyed and the establishment of security is identified as critical to the success of a postconflict reconstruction.
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III. Methodology

Selection of Variables
In a system dynamics simulation the determination of the model’s structure is
critical (Forrester, 1969:114). “The first step in modeling is to generate a model that
creates the problem” (Forrester, 1969:113). A model must contain “all the interacting
relationships necessary to lead the system into trouble” (Forrester, 1969:113). If such a
model cannot be created then there is no hope that the system can be restructured to lead
the system’s internal processes in a different direction (Forrester, 1969:113). In order to
simulate the behavior of a complex system, variables must be selected that can represent
different aspects of the state of the system.
This study identified 23 state variables for inclusion in the general case of the
stability operations model. These variables were selected with the aim that collectively
they describe the state of the stability operation adequately enough so that various macrolevel policies can be tested using the simulation. These variables were also selected so
that, as much as possible, they represent directly measurable real world phenomena. The
23 state variables used in this model fall into six basic categories: (1) the indigenous
security institutions, (2) law enforcement, (3) the labor market, (4) insurgent activity and
coalition military activity, (5) critical infrastructures, and (6) public opinion.
In a post-conflict reconstruction effort the development of legitimate and stable
security institutions is critical to the establishment of a safe and secure environment (Play
to Win, 2003:10). Creating a secure environment calls for diverse capabilities that
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include “border patrol; customs support; weapons collection; large-scale (belligerent
groups) and targeted (indicted persons) apprehension conducted in coordination with
police” (Play to Win, 2003:10). Depending on the post-conflict situation, the intervening
military will likely have to perform these security duties at the outset of a stability
operation, but as the intervening military forces “adapt their roles and force levels to the
changing security situation” the indigenous security forces will have to assume increased
responsibility or a security gap could develop (Play to Win, 2003:10). This model
captures the capacity of the indigenous security institutions by tracking their manning
levels. The manning levels of the various security institutions are represented with six
state variables: (1) the number of indigenous border patrol personnel, (2) the number of
indigenous civil defense personnel, (3) the number of indigenous military personnel, (4)
the number of indigenous border patrol personnel in training, (5) the number of
indigenous civil defense personnel in training, and (6) the number of indigenous military
personnel in training.
Law enforcement capabilities are important in post-conflict situations. “A peace
operation must clear the way for the rule of law if a durable peace is to emerge from the
disorder of internal conflict” (Warner et al. 2000:iii). U.S. Joint Doctrine for Military
Operations Other than War (MOOTW) says that a foreign internal defense program
aimed at assisting another nation against subversion and insurgency may need to combat
threats to host nation security such as civil unrest, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism
(JP 3-07, 1995:III-10). These threats and others are often best combated with law
enforcement personnel and to that end the U.S. has joint doctrine that governs the training
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of indigenous law enforcement personnel (JP 3-07.3, 1999:III-5). This model captures
the indigenous law enforcement capacity through two state variables: (1) the number of
indigenous police officers and (2) the number of indigenous police officers in training.
The effectiveness of anti-crime efforts is gauged in this model through the numbers of
criminals and incarcerated criminals in the country; in this model a criminal is defined as
anyone who seeks to support themselves through illegal means (i.e. theft, fraud,
extortion).
The labor market is included in the model because getting people back to work
and establishing some sort of economic normalcy after a conflict is important for creating
and maintaining post-conflict security. A report of the UN Secretary-General listed
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of military forces after a conflict
as one of the priorities of post-conflict peace building (UN, 1998: paragraph 66). The
DDR helps reduce the risk of a return to conflict “both through the direct effects of
decreased military expenditure and manpower and through the indirect effects on growth
and poverty reduction of budget reallocation and the return of the labor force” (Collier,
Elliott, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol, and Sambanis, 2003: 159).
There is a fear among policy makers that the demobilization of large numbers of
soldiers will be disruptive and that demobilized soldiers will turn to violent crime to
support themselves (Collier et al., 2003:161). The World Bank suggests that the way to
mitigate this risk is to provide productive economic opportunities for soldiers who have
been demobilized (Collier et al., 2003:161). As a result, it is essential that the provision
of jobs and other economic opportunities be emphasized to facilitate the DDR of former

20

soldiers and the creation of a stable post-conflict environment. The state of the labor
market in this initial model is described by four state variables: (1) unemployed persons
including discouraged workers, (2) non-military non-police government employees, (3)
private sector employees, and (4) the country’s per capita gross domestic product.
The amount of insurgent activity as well as the amount of coalition military
activity are important measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for stability operations.
Examples of MOEs of security in a peace operation include the number of incidents of
hostile fire per week and the number of patrols per week (Challenges Project, 2002:265).
In this model insurgent activity and coalition activity are captured by three state
variables: (1) the number of insurgents in country, (2) the number of detained insurgents,
and (3) the number of coalition troops in country.
“War destroys infrastructure, leaving the population in conditions that increase
the risk of disease” and other humanitarian crises (Collier et al., 2003:169). The critical
infrastructures in this model are infrastructures that are deemed initially essential for
preventing humanitarian crisis and or social unrest. Some critical infrastructures are
country specific, others are universal. Potable water and food distribution infrastructures
are universally critical infrastructures. Shelter, electricity, and fuel among others are
critical in some settings, while not as critical in other settings. For example, in Iraq the
fuel production and distribution infrastructure is deemed critical, as many people rely on
it for cooking and transportation (Hamre, Barton, Crocker, Mendelson-Forman, and Orr,
2003:4). A widespread disruption in the distribution of fuel could lead to increased social
unrest (Hamre et al., 2003:5). In the general model proposed here, food, fuel, water, and
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electricity are included as critical infrastructures. When the model is applied in a specific
case it is expected that other critical infrastructures of interest will be identified and
added. Critical infrastructure capacity is represented in this model by four state variables:
(1) the amount of water delivered daily, (2) the amount of food delivered daily, (3) the
amount of fuel delivered daily, and (4) the amount of electricity delivered daily.
The final basic category is the public opinion of the occupation among the
indigenous population. In this category public opinion is represented by two state
variables: (1) the number of people who are dissatisfied with the coalition’s occupation
and (2) the number of people who are neutral to or satisfied with the coalition’s
occupation. These variables are included to act as proxies for the perceived legitimacy of
the occupation and indigenous government being supported by the occupation. The
development of a legitimate indigenous government is essential to the creation of
sustainable security (Play to Win, 2003:14). “Ultimately, it is the extent to which a
coherent, legitimate government exists – or can be created – that determines the success
or failure of post-conflict reconstruction” (Play to Win, 2003:14).
Rates of Change
The model developed in this study represents a stability operation and its
environment as a network of interconnected level values and rates of change (see Figure
3.1). The level values identify the state of the system while the rates of change describe
how those level values evolve over time. The previous section identified a set of 23 state
variables, or level values, that capture important aspects of the stability operation and its
environment. These level values capture the state of the stability operation but by
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themselves do not develop over time. Each level value has one or more rates of change
associated with it. These rates of change determine how the level values evolve over
time and together they determine how the entire system evolves over time. Figure 3.1
shows the overall structure of the model.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 list each of the level values in this model and their associated
rates of change. The direction of change column indicates what effect a positive rate of
change will have on its associated level value. A plus sign indicates that a positive rate of
change will increase the size of the level value, and a negative rate of change will
decrease the size of the level value. A minus sign indicates that a positive rate of change
will decrease the size of the level value, and a negative rate of change will increase the
size of the level value.
Table 3.1: Non-Labor Force Level Values and Associated Rates of Change
Level Value

Direction of
Change

Per Capita GDP

Associated Rates of Change

+
+
-

Per Capita GDP Growth Rate
Coalition Troop Rate of Change
Coalition Casualty Rate

Amount of Water Delivered Daily

+

Water Infrastructure Development Rate

Amount of Food Delivered Daily

-

Food Infrastructure Development Rate

Amount of Fuel Delivered Daily

+

Fuel Infrastructure Development Rate

Amount of Electricity Delivered Daily

-

Electricity Infrastructure Development Rate

-

Public Opinion Rate of Change

+

Public Opinion Rate of Change

Coalition Military Forces

People Who are Dissatisfied with the
Occupation
People who are Neutral to or Support the
Occupation
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Table 3.2: Labor Force Level Values and Associated Rates of Change
Level Value
Indigenous Border Patrol
Personnel
Indigenous Border Patrol
Personnel in Training
Indigenous Civil Defense
Service Personnel
Indigenous Civil Defense
Service Personnel in Training
Indigenous Military Personnel
Indigenous Military Personnel
in Training
Indigenous Police Officers
Indigenous Police Officers in
Training
Criminals
Incarcerated Criminals

Unemployed Persons

Government Employees
Private Sector Employees
Insurgents
Detained Insurgents

Direction
of Change

Associated Rates of Change

-

Border Patrol Personnel KIA Rate
Border Patrol Attrition Rate

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-

Border Patrol Personnel Graduation Rate from Training
Recruitment Rate of Border Patrol Personnel Trainees
Border Patrol Personnel Graduation Rate from Training
Civil Defense Personnel KIA Rate
Civil Defense Attrition Rate
Civil Defense Personnel Graduation Rate from Training
Recruitment Rate of Civil Defense Personnel Trainees
Civil Defense Personnel Graduation Rate from Training
Indigenous Military KIA Rate
Indigenous Military Attrition Rate
Indigenous Military Graduation Rate from Training
Recruitment Rate of Indigenous Military Trainees
Indigenous Military Graduation Rate from Training
Police Officer KIA Rate
Police Officer Attrition Rate
Police Officer Graduation Rate from Training
Recruitment Rate of Police Officer Trainees
Police Officer Graduation Rate from Training
Rate of Criminal Recruitment
Criminal Apprehension Rate
Criminal Apprehension Rate
Incarcerated Criminal Release Rate
Recruitment Rate of Border Patrol Personnel Trainees
Recruitment Rate of Civil Defense Personnel Trainees
Recruitment Rate of Indigenous Military Trainees
Recruitment Rate of Police Officer Trainees
Rate of Criminal Recruitment
Recruitment Rate of Government Employees
Private Sector Hiring Rate
Insurgent Recruit Rate
Detained Insurgent Release Rate
Incarcerated Criminal Release Rate
Recruitment Rate of Government Employees
Private Sector Hiring Rate
Insurgent Rate of Change
Insurgent Killed or Capture Rate
Insurgent Capture Rate
Detained Insurgent Release Rate
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Figure 3.1: General Post-Conflict Reconstruction Model
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Table 3.1 presents the level values and the associated rates of change of public
opinion, critical infrastructures, coalition military capability, and the per capita GDP.
Table 3.2 presents each of the level values and the associated rates of change for the total
labor force of the indigenous population. Everyone in the indigenous country’s labor
force is categorized as either unemployed, a criminal, an insurgent, a private employee or
some form of government employee. In this model these categories are clearly defined
and assumed to be mutually exclusive. Unemployed people are defined as discouraged
workers and people actively looking for a job. Criminals are defined as people who do
not hold a legal job and support themselves through illegal activity. Insurgents are
defined as people actively working to thwart the occupation through violence. Insurgents
can commit crime, but criminals do not work to thwart the occupation. As the model
evolves over time, people move back and forth between the unemployed category and the
various categories in accordance with the associated rates of change.
In an effort to make the model easier to explain and understand, it has been
divided up into six sub-models. These six sub-models correspond to the six basic aspects
of a stability operation identified in the previous section. These are indigenous security
institutions, law enforcement, coalition military and insurgent activity, the labor market,
critical infrastructures, and public opinion. Figure 3.2 shows a high level representation
of the general stability operations model in terms of these six sub-models. The arrows in
the figure represent the effects each sub-model has on the other sub-models. Effects may
be direct or indirect. As noted by the single and double headed arrows, some interactions
have been modeled as one way interactions while others have been formulated as two
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way interactions. Of course other modules can be added as desired. In the following six
sections the rates of change associated with each of the level values in each of these submodels are identified and explained.

Labor
Market

Law
Enforcement

Coalition
Military and
Insurgent
Activities

Indigenous
Security
Institutions

Critical
Infrastructure

Public
Opinion

Figure 3.2: Sub-model Connections
Indigenous Security Institutions Sub-model
The indigenous security institutions sub model is comprised of three
organizations: (1) the border patrol, (2) the civil defense force, and (3) the indigenous
military. Each of these organizations has a different influence on other level and rate
values in the model. The level of border patrol personnel affects the number of
international insurgents that can slip into the country. The number of civil defense
personnel and the number of indigenous military personnel each exert a different
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influence on the number successful insurgent attacks on the country’s critical
infrastructure and the rate at which insurgents are captured or killed.
Figure 3.3 presents the structure of the indigenous security institutions sub-model.
The state of the indigenous security institutions is represented by six level values; its
development over time is determined by 12 associated rates of change. Level values (i.e.
state variables) are represented as rectangular boxes, flows of people are represented as
solid arrows, rates of change are represented as arrow boxes (i.e. valves), parametric
inputs are represented as dashed arrows, and level values that are exogenous to the model
are represented as clouds.
Unemployed persons are recruited into the training programs of the three security
services at the rates determined by equations 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.
Eq. 3.1 BPRecruitRate(t) ~ BPRRDist (µ BP Re cruitRate (t ), σ BP Re cruitRate (t ) )
Eq. 3.2 CDRecruitRate(t) ~ CDRRDist (µ CD Re cruitRate (t ), σ CD Re cruitRate (t ) )
Eq. 3.3 IMRecruitRate(t) ~ IMRRDist (µ IM Re cruitRate (t ), σ IM Re cruitRate (t ) )

These rates are the daily numbers of unemployed people who join the training programs
of the border patrol, the civil defense force, and the indigenous military. As unemployed
people enter into the training program of each security service they change their
employment status. They are re-classified as border patrol trainees, civil defense force
trainees, and indigenous military trainees respectively. For example, a border patrol
recruitment rate of x people per day would increase the border patrol personnel in training
level by x people per day and decrease the unemployed persons level by x people per day.

28

Civil Defense
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Defense
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(Eq 3.8)

Civil Defense
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Civil Defense
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Civil Defense
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(Eq 3.5)
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Border Patrol
Personnel
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(Eq 3.10)
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Border Patrol
Attrition Rate
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Figure 3.3: Indigenous Security Institutions Sub-model

The recruitment rates of the three security services are determined by factors
exogenous to the model, such as the wages offered to members of each of the security
services and the maximum capacities of the training facilities for each of the security
services. The distributions of each of these three rates depend on the operational
situation being modeled. If known distributions or rates exist, they would, of course, be
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utilized. If they do not exist, research could be done to develop distributions or rates (a
function has also been suggested). A potential distribution would be the Poisson
distribution as it is a discrete distribution well suited for modeling an arrival process
(Kulkarni, 1995:199). If a Poisson distribution is used, the recruitment rates of the three
security services would be given by equations 3.1a, 3.2a, and 3.3a.
Eq. 3.1a BPRecruitRate(t) ~ Poisson( λ BPRR (t ) )
Eq. 3.2a CDRecruitRate(t) ~ Poisson( λCDRR (t ) )
Eq. 3.3a IMRecruitRate(t) ~ Poisson( λ IMRR (t ) )

Once trainees have entered the training programs for their security service they
are batched into classes. Each class takes a predetermined number of training days
before it is graduated and enters active duty. The maximum number and size of the
training classes, as well as the lengths of the training programs, are determined by factors
such as the skill requirements of each of the security services, the time it takes for
trainees to reach the required skill level, the size of the training cadre, and the maximum
capacities of the training facilities in the theater. These factors are exogenous to the
model and would be based on specific operational requirements. The class size,
maximum number of classes, and training length are potential policy factors that can be
tested with this model.
Not every trainee who enters the training program of one of the security services
graduates. A percentage of each of the training classes is assumed to return to
unemployed status at the end of their training program. (It would be possible to have
trainees washout throughout the program if such fidelity were desired. It has not been
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provided in this model, however.) This percentage (xxxTrainingAttrition) is the training
program’s attrition rate. It is represented by a random variable whose functional
distribution is determined by factors exogenous to the model. While the functional
distribution of each training program’s attrition rate must be chosen to reflect the
specifics of each different scenario being modeled, a possible choice would be a Beta
distribution as it returns a number between two endpoints and can be parameterized to be
skewed as the scenario requires.
The graduation rates of each of the security services are discrete functions. For
the days when there is no class of trainees graduating, the graduation rate for each of the
security service training programs are zero. On the days that a class is graduating the
graduation rate for that security service is the class size multiplied by one minus the
training program’s attrition rate. The graduation day for a particular class is the start date
of that class plus the class length. The graduation rates for the border patrol, the civil
defense force, and the indigenous military are given by equations 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6
respectively.
Eq. 3.4 BPGradRate(t) =
⎧ BPGradClassSize(t ) * (1 − BPTrainingAttrition(t ) ) if StartDate + Classlength(t ) = CurrentDate
⎨
otherwise
⎩0

Eq. 3.5 CDGradRate(t) =
⎧CDGradClassSize(t ) * (1 − CDTraining Attrition (t ) ) if StartDate + Classlength(t ) = CurrentDate
⎨
otherwise
⎩0

Eq. 3.6 IMGradRate(t) =
⎧ IMGradClassSize(t ) * (1 − IMTrainingAttrition(t ) ) if StartDate + Classlength(t ) = CurrentDate
⎨
otherwise
⎩0
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A possible expansion to the model would be to allow training programs of different
lengths and intensities to graduate security personnel with different levels of
effectiveness. This would allow policies concerning the trade-offs between the quality
and quantity of security personnel to be tested, for example.
As the trainees of each of the security services graduate and transition to active
duty status, the number of trainees in the affected security service training program
decreases accordingly and the number of active duty personnel in the respective security
service increases accordingly. The model assumes that the number of active duty
personnel in each security services can only be increased by the graduation of classes of
trainees. The number of active duty security personnel in each of the security services
decreases as a result of that service’s casualty rate and its active duty attrition rate.
The active duty attrition rate of each of the security services represents the rate at
which active duty security personnel separate from their jobs. The model then returns
these individuals to unemployed status where they remain until they enter some other
employment category. These separations could be as a result of personnel quitting, being
fired, or being incapacitated to an extent that they can no longer perform their job. The
active duty attrition rate for each of the security services are random variables whose
functional distributions depend on the particular scenario being simulated, and are
determined by factors exogenous to the model. A possible distribution might be a
discrete uniform distribution, for example. The active duty attrition rates for the three
security services are given by equations 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9.
Eq. 3.7 BPAttritionRate(t) ~ BPARDist (µ BPAttritionRate (t ), σ BPAttritionRate (t ) )
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Eq. 3.8 CDAttritionRate(t) ~ CDARDist (µ CDAttritionRate (t ), σ CDAttritionRate (t ) )
Eq. 3.9 IMAttritionRate ~ IMARDist (µ IMAttritionRate (t ), σ IMAttritionRate (t ) )

A possible expansion to the model would be to make the attrition rates of the security
services dynamic by making the attrition rates of the security services functions of the
casualty rates of each security service, the public opinion, or perhaps other economic
opportunities.
The killed in action rate of each of the security services is the rate at which the
active duty security personnel of each of the services are killed. The security service
personnel who are killed leave active duty status and are eliminated from the model,
instead of returning to unemployed status as happens to the active duty security personnel
who have been attrited.
In this “first-cut” model, security forces that are wounded are not modeled, only
the killed in action rates for each of the security services are modeled. These killed in
action rates are functions of the daily number of insurgent attacks, the likelihood that
casualties occur, and the effectiveness of the security forces. The killed in action rates
for the border patrol, civil defense force, and indigenous military are given by equations
3.10, 3.11, and 3.12 respectively.
Eq 3.10 BPKIARate(t) =
BPAttackEffectivenessParameter(t) * #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) * BPCasualtyRandomVariable(t)
Eq 3.11 CDKIARate(t) =
CDAttackEffectivenessParameter(t) * #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) * CDCasualtyRandomVariable(t)
Eq 3.12 IMKIARate(t) =
IMAttackEffectivenessParameter(t) * #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) * IMCasualtyRandomVariable(t)

33

Law Enforcement Sub-model
The law enforcement sub-model simulates the amount of violent crime in a
country as a function of the number of police officers and criminals in the country. This
is done with four level values and seven rates of change. Figure 3.4 shows the structure
of the law enforcement sub-model. Equations 3.20 and 3.21, represented in figure 3.2 as
ovals, are instantaneously computed functions.
In the law enforcement sub-model the recruitment, training, and deployment of
police officers are modeled in the same manner as the security personnel recruitment,
training, and deployment are modeled in the indigenous security institution sub-model.
However, the specific parameter values in the various rate functions are different as the
appropriate parameters for modeling police officer training and deployment are not
necessarily the same parameters necessary for modeling the training and deployment of
security services. The police recruitment rate is the rate at which police officer trainees
are recruited out of the pool of unemployed people. This rate is given by equation 3.13.
Eq. 3.13 PORecruitRate(t) ~ PORRDist (µ PO Re cruitRate (t ), σ PO Re cruitRate (t ) )

Once police officer trainees are recruited, they are batched into classes and are trained for
the amount of time required. Once a class of police officer trainees has trained for the
required amount of time, the class is graduated and the police officer trainees in the class
become active duty police officers. Like the security forces, not every police officer
trainee graduates. It is again assumed that on graduation day a percentage of the
graduating class is returned to unemployed status according to the training attrition rate.
This police officer trainee attrition rate is a random variable whose functional distribution
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is determined by factors exogenous to the model. It would be fitted or selected according
to specific situational needs. The police officer graduation rate (POGradRate) is given
by equation 3.14.
Eq. 3.14 POGradRate(t) =
⎧ POGradClassSize(t ) * (1 − POTrainingAttrition (t ) ) if StartDate + Classlength(t ) = CurrentDate
⎨
otherwise
⎩0

As currently modeled, the number of active duty police officers can only be increased by classes
of police officer trainees graduating from the police officer training program.
Insurgents

Crime Rate
Eq 3.20

Incarcerated
Criminals

Criminals

Coalition Troops
Policing Eq 3.21
Criminal
Release
Rate
(Eq 3.19)

Unemployed
persons

Criminal
Apprehension
Rate (Eq 3.18)

Police
KIA
Rate
(Eq 3.16)

Criminal
Recruitment
Rate (Eq 3.17)

Indigenous
Police Officers
in Training
Police
Recruitment
Rate (Eq 3.13)

Indigenous
Police Officers

Police
Graduation
Rate (Eq 3.14)

Police Attrition
Rate (Eq 3.15)

Figure 3.4: Law Enforcement Sub-model
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The number of police officers on active duty is reduced by police officer attrition
and police officer casualties. Police officers are lost as a result of officers quitting, being
fired, or being severely wounded is accounted for by the police officer attrition rate. This
rate is a random variable whose functional distribution must be chosen to reflect the
particular idiosyncrasies of each scenario being simulated. The police officer attrition
rate is the rate at which active duty police officers leave active duty police officer status
and return to unemployed status. This rate is given by equation 3.15.
Eq. 3.15 POAttritionRate(t) ~ POARDist (µ BPAttritionRate (t ), σ BPAttritionRate (t ) )

The number of active duty police officers lost due to death is accounted for by the
police officer killed in action rate. The police officers who are killed leave active duty
status and are eliminated from the model. They do not return to unemployed status as do
the police officers who are attrited. The police officer casualty rate is a function of the
crime rate and the number of insurgent attacks and is given by equation 3.16.
Eq. 3.16 POKIARate(t) =
InsurgentAttackOnPoliceEffectParameter(t) * PoliceKIARandVar(t) * #ofAttacks(t)
+ PoliceCrimeRateEffectParameter(t) * PoliceKIARandVar(t) * CrimeRate(t)

In this baseline model each member of the country’s labor force belongs to one of
a number of different employment categories. Some of these employment categories
have been discussed in previous sections, such as the employment categories related to
the indigenous security forces, and some of these categories will be explained in the
following sections. Three of these employment categories are the unemployed persons
category, the criminals category, and the insurgent category. The unemployed category
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will be discussed further in the labor market section, and the insurgent category will be
further explored in the coalition military and insurgent activities section. However, for
the purpose of explaining how the term criminal is defined in this model a few remarks
are necessary here. Criminals are defined in the model as anyone who supports
themselves through violent crime. Unemployed persons are defined as people who are
either actively looking for a job or are discouraged workers. Insurgents are defined as
anyone working for the violent overthrow of the occupation. While it is recognized that
an insurgent may support themselves through a job, for example, at this level of fidelity,
the model does not consider overlapping groupings. In this baseline model it is assumed
employment categories are mutually exclusive and that a person cannot belong to two of
these categories at once. People in the unemployed category are assumed to not commit
crimes, people in the criminal category are assumed to not attack coalition troops, and
people in the insurgents category both commit crime and attack coalition troops.
A recent study of cross-national panel data of homicide rates from 117 countries
in the period 1980-1997 suggests that both economic growth and high income levels
lower homicide rates (Neumayer, 2003:635). This is consistent with the rational choice
theory of crime. The rational choice theory of crime assumes that an individual “weighs
the benefits against the costs of committing violent crime and decides to commit the
crime if the net present value of the benefit exceeds the net present value cost”
(Neumayer, 2003:623). According to this rational choice theory of crime, policies that
raise the costs of committing crime reduce the crime rate (Neumayer, 2003:623).
Increasing the probability of apprehension for criminals lowers the crime rate by directly
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increasing the costs of committing a crime, while improving the economic prospects of
individuals lowers the crime rate by increasing the opportunity cost of committing crime.
This model assumes a rational choice theory of crime. The number of criminals
in the country increases when unemployed persons to stop looking for a job and start
supporting themselves through crime. The rate at which unemployed people turn to
crime is the criminal recruitment rate. A positive criminal recruitment rate is associated
with an increase in the number of criminals, while a negative criminal recruitment rate is
associated with criminals choosing to stop supporting themselves through crime and start
looking for jobs.
The criminal recruitment rate is a function of the number of unemployed people
in the country and the criminal apprehension rate. Representing the criminal recruitment
rate as a function of the number of unemployed people and the criminal apprehension rate
is consistent with both empirical evidence and the rational choice theory of crime. Using
data from a survey of over 16,000 high school students in the United States a paper
published in by the National Bureau of Economic Research found that violent crime rates
are directly correlated with unemployment (Mocan and Rees, 1999:Abstract). This is
also consistent with the rational choice theory of crime, as an increase in employment
options increases the opportunity cost of crime. The criminal recruitment rate used in this
model is given in equation 3.17.
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Eq 3.17 CriminalRecruitRate(t) = CriminalRecruitRateInterceptParameter(t) +
UnemploymentEffectParameter(t) * UnemploymentLevel(t) +
CriminalApprehensionRateEffectParameter(t) * CriminalApprehensionRate(t) +
CriminalRecruitRateDist (µ C Re cruitRate (t ), σ C Re cruitRate (t ) )

The criminal apprehension rate is the daily number of criminals arrested. It
represents the rate at which criminals transition from criminal status to incarcerated
criminal status. The criminal apprehension rate is a function of the number of criminals
in the country, the number of coalition military troops working to suppress crime, the
number of civil defense troops, and the number of active duty indigenous police officers.
The criminal apprehension rate is given by equation 3.18.
Eq. 3.18 CriminalApprehensionRate(t) = Criminals *
(PoliceEffectParameter(t) * PoliceOfficers(t) + CivilDefenseTroopEffectParameter(t) *
CivilDefenceTroops(t) + CMilitaryEffectParameter(t) * CMilitaryPolicing(t)) *
CriminalApprehensionRateRandVar(t)

Each police officer, civil defense troop, and coalition military troop working at crime
suppression apprehends a certain number of criminals each day. This apprehension rate
is determined in equation 3.18 by the police effectiveness parameter, the civil defense
troop effectiveness parameter, and the coalition military effectiveness parameter. These
effectiveness parameters can be constants to model the effectiveness of police and troops
as a linear function of their numbers, or the effectiveness parameters can themselves be
functions of the numbers of police and troops to model non-linearity associated with
economies and diseconomies of scale with respect to law enforcement manning levels.
The criminal apprehension rate is also a function of the total number of criminals in the
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country; the more criminals there are in the country the likelier it is that a given number
will be apprehend.
Currently the model assumes that all indigenous police officers are equally
effective, and that all coalition troops working in police operations are equally effective.
A possible expansion to the model would be to model the effectiveness of different types
of troops to be different. For instance, in such an expansion an infantry unit working in
police operations would not apprehend as many criminals as a military police unit of the
same size. Another possible expansion would be to model translators who might improve
the effectiveness of coalition military troops working at police operations.
Every day a percentage of the incarcerated criminals are released. These released
criminals represent criminals who were investigated and released; tried, found not guilty,
and released; and criminals who were convicted, served their prison sentence, and
released. The percentage of incarcerated criminals released each day has been modeled
as a random variable whose distribution must be selected to fit the particular scenario
being simulated. The factors that influence the choice of what distribution to use are
factors such as the length of typical sentences for various crimes and the percentage of
trials that lead to convictions. The incarcerated criminal release rate is given by equation
3.19.
Eq. 3.19 IncarceratedCriminalReleaseRate(t) =
IncarceratedCriminal(t) * IncarceratedCriminalsReleaseRandVar(t)

In this model the crime rate has been expressed as a function of the number of
insurgents and criminals in the country. The model assumes that each criminal and each
insurgent in the country commits a certain number of crimes a day, and as a result the
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crime rate is computed based on the number of criminals and insurgents in the country.
The crime rate is represented by equation 3.20.
Eq 3.20 CrimeRate(t) = CrimeRateRandVar(t) * (Criminals(t) * CrimesPerCriminal(t) +
Insurgents(t) * CrimesPerInsurgent(t))

The crime rate random variable introduces variability into the crime rate to account for
random influences on the crime rate that are not explicitly included in the model. The
choice of the distribution for the crime rate random variable is situation dependent.
The number of coalition troops conducting crime suppression operations is given
by equation 3.21. The allocation of coalition troops between border patrol activities,
crime suppression operations, and counter insurgency operations is directly impacted by
the modeler.
Eq. 3.21 CoaltionTroopsPolicing(t) = TotalCoaltionTroops(t) * %CoalitionPolicing(t)

Insurgent and Coalition Military Activities Sub-model
The insurgent and coalition military activities sub-model is comprised of three level
values and six rates of change. The level values are the number of coalition troops in the
country, the number of insurgents in the country, and the number of insurgents being
detained by the coalition. Figure 3.5 illustrates the nexus of these levels and rates. The
coalition troop level is influenced by two rates of change: (1) the coalition troop casualty
rate and (2) the coalition troops in country rate of change. The coalition troop rate of
change represents the net rate at which coalition troops are arriving or departing the country.
The modeler sets this rate and can set it at different levels to test the effect of various
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Figure 3.5: Insurgent and Coalition Military Activities Sub-model
buildup and drawdown policies. Equation 3.22 gives the coalition troops in country rate of
change if the modeler wants to maintain constant a troop level throughout the simulation.
Eq. 3.22 CoalitionTroopsInCountryRate(t) = CoalitionTroopCasualtyRate(t)
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Formulating the coalition troops in country rate of change in this manner and holding the
troop level constant means that the number of troops in country is only increased in order
to compensate for casualties. The coalition troops in country rate could just as easily be
set to some other approximate rate by the modeler to represent a specific situation or
policy.
The coalition troop casualty rate is the rate at which coalition troops are killed or
wounded to the extent that they cannot function as effective troops. The coalition troop
casualty rate is a function of the number of daily insurgent attacks, the likelihood of
casualties, and the effectiveness of the troops. The coalition troop casualty rate is given
by equation 3.23.
Eq. 3.23 CoalitionTroopCasualtyRate(t) =
InsurgentAttackOnCoalitionEffectParameter(t) * #ofAttacks(t) * CTCasualtyRandVar(t)

The coalition troops in country level value is decreased by the number of troops that have
been killed or wounded. Troops that are killed or wounded leave the model and are no
longer available for operations. To maintain a specified level of effectiveness the troops
would have to be replaced.
The allocation of the coalition troops in country between the different types of
activities is a model parameter. Troops can be allocated into three different activities:
crime suppression operations, border patrol operations, and counter insurgency
operations. This troop allocation is represented by three functions that are
instantaneously computed based on the troops in country level value and the allocation
ratios set by the modeler. Troop allocation between crime suppression operations, border
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patrol operations, and counter insurgency operations are given by equations 3.21, 3.24,
and 3.25 respectivly. The three parameters %CoalitionPolicing,
%CoalitionPatrollingBorders, and %CounterInsurgency must always sum to one.
(Equation 3.21 was discussed in the previous section and is included here for
completeness.)
Eq. 3.21 #CoaltionPolicing(t) = TotalCoaltionTroops(t) * %CoalitionPolicing(t)
Eq. 3.24 #CoalitionPatrolingBorders(t) =
TotalCoaltionTroops(t) * %CoalitionPatrollingBorders(t)
Eq. 3.25 #CoalitionCounterInsurgency(t) =
TotalCoalitionTroops(t) * %CounterInsurgency(t)

As currently configured this model assumes that every coalition troop is equally effective
at each activity. This is not the case in the real world. A possible expansion to the model
would be to allow troops to be retrained over a period of time to increase their
effectiveness at different activities. For instance, an infantry unit could spend six weeks
training in crime suppression activities to improve its effectiveness at crime suppression.
In this model an insurgent is defined as anyone who is actively working to thwart
the coalition through violence. This model assumes the insurgents attempt to thwart the
coalition by attacking coalition targets and targets viewed as sympathetic to the coalition.
In this model these are assumed to be coalition troops, indigenous security forces,
indigenous police, the civilian population, and critical infrastructure. Insurgents actively
working to thwart the coalition may also commit non-insurgency related crime, such as
running a protection racket or a car theft ring. As a result the number of insurgents in the
country affects the crime rate. However, people defined as criminals in this model do not
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engage in anti-coalition violence per se, and the number of criminals in the country has
no influence on the number of insurgent attacks.
In a working paper for the Center on Social and Economic Dynamics in 2001,
Epstein, Steinbruner, and Parker present an agent based approach to modeling civil
violence based on rational choice. In their model each member of the general population
can either be “rebellious” or “quiescent” (Epstein et al., 2001:2). The decision to rebel
(or not) for each member of the population is made based on which action will maximize
their expected utility (Epstein et al., 2001:5). Each person’s expected utility for revolting
is dependent on their risk tolerance, their level of grievance against the government, and
their assessment of the probability of being arrested (Epstein et al., 2001:3-5). Each
person’s expected utility for not revolting is set at an arbitrary level T (Epstein et al.,
2001:6). If a person’s expected utility for revolting exceeds their expected utility for not
revolting they will join the rebellion; if a person’s expected utility for not revolting
exceeds their expected utility from revolting they become quiescent (Epstein et al.,
2001:5).
The model presented in this thesis uses a similar approach to simulating
insurgency. It is assumed that based on a utility maximization calculation people make a
rational choice between joining the insurgency and being unemployed. The rate at which
people transition from unemployed status to insurgent status is the insurgent rate of
change, which is a function of the rate at which insurgents are being killed or captured
and the number of people who are dissatisfied with the occupation. The insurgent rate of
change is given by equation 3.26.
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Eq. 3.26 InsurgentRateOfChange(t) =DissatisfiedPeople(t) *
InsurgentKilledorDetainedEffectParameter(t) * InsurgentKilledOrDetainedRate(t) *
InsurgentRateOfChangeRandVar(t)

The InsurgentKilledorDetainedEffectParameter and the distribution of the
InsurgentRateOfChangeRandVar depend on the specifics of the scenario being modeled,
and have to be set according to each individual situation. They could, however, be
parameters which vary according to other effects in an expression of the model.
In addition to the domestic insurgents who join the insurgency from the ranks of
the unemployed, international sympathizers can travel to the country and join the
insurgency. Of the total number of insurgents that try to enter the country, some
percentage is turned back by the indigenous border guards and the coalition troops who
are patrolling the borders. The rate at which international insurgents enter the country is
give by equation 3.27.
Eq. 3.27 InternationalInsurgentRate(t) = TotalInternationalInsurgentsRandVar(t) *
(BorderPatrolEffectParameter(t) * BorderPatrolTroops(t) +
CoalitionPatrollingBorderEffectParameter(t) * CoalitionPatrollingBorder(t))

The total number of international insurgents is a random variable whose distribution
depends on factors specific to the modeled environment, such as the international
perception of the legitimacy of the occupation, and the international perception of the
legitimacy of the insurgency. While the specifics of each situation dictate the appropriate
distribution for this random variable, a Poisson distribution would be a possible choice as
the number of international insurgents trying to enter the country is an arrival rate.
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The insurgent killed or detained rate is the rate at which insurgents are either
killed or detained. The level value for insurgents is decreased every day by this rate. Of
the total daily number of insurgents apprehended some percentage are killed in the course
of their apprehension and the rest are detained. The percentage of insurgents that are
killed is a random variable whose distribution depends on the specifics of the individual
scenario being modeled. The insurgents that are killed in the course of their
apprehension are eliminated from the model. The insurgents that are detained transition
to the detained insurgents category.
The rate at which insurgents are apprehended is a function of the total number of
insurgents, the number of coalition military troops conducting counter insurgency
operations, the size of indigenous military, the size of the civil defense force, the number
of tips the coalition receives on insurgent activity. The insurgent killed or detained rate is
given by equation 3.28, this rate is subtracted from the insurgents level value. The
insurgent detention rate, the rate that is added to the detained insurgents level value is
given by equation 3.28a.
Eq. 3.28 InsurgentKilledOrDetainedRate(t) =
Insurgents(t) * (CTroopsCounterInsurgEffectParameter(t) * CTroopsInCounterInsurg(t)
+ IMEffectParameter(t) * IndigenousMilitaryTroops(t) + CDEffectParameter(t) *
CivilDefenseTroops(t)) * TipsOnInsurgency(t) * InsurgentAppRandVar(t)
Eq. 3.28a InsurgentDetentionRate(t) =
(1-InsurgentKilledRate(t)) * InsurgentKilledOrDetainedRate(t)

Every day a percentage of the detained insurgents are released. This represents
the fact that some insurgents that have been apprehended and detained are determined to
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no longer be a threat and are released. This percentage is a random number whose
distribution depends on factors exogenous to the model such as the standard of proof
coalition forces use when deciding who should and should not be detained. When
formerly detained insurgents are released, they return to unemployed status from which
they may or may not rejoin the insurgency or the workforce. The insurgent release rate is
given by equation 3.29.
Eq. 3.29 InsurgentReleaseRate(t) = DetainedInsurgents(t) * InsurgentReleaseRandVar(t)

The amount of insurgent activity is represented in this model by the number of
attacks the insurgents make on coalition targets and targets perceived by the insurgency
as sympathetic to the coalition. The number of insurgent attacks is a direct function of
the number of insurgents in the country, the likelihood of attack, and their effectiveness
rate. The number of insurgent attacks is given by equation 3.30.
Eq. 3.30 #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) =
Insurgents(t) * InsurgentEffectParameter(t) * InsurgentAttackRandVar(t)

The insurgent effectiveness parameter is the average number of attacks each insurgent is
able to make each day. The insurgent attack is a random variable that introduces
variability into the number of attacks each insurgent can make per day. The distribution
of the insurgent attack random variable must be chosen by the modeler to fit the
particular scenario being modeled.
A percentage of the total number of insurgent attacks is attacks on critical
infrastructure targets. The number of insurgent attacks on critical infrastructure targets is
a function of the size of civil defense force, the total number of insurgent attacks, and the
percentage of the total number of attacks that are attacks on critical infrastructure targets.
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This percentage is a random variable whose distribution is determined by factors
exogenous to the model, such as the strategy of the insurgency. The number of insurgent
attacks on infrastructure is given by equation 3.31.

Eq. 3.31 #OfInfrastructureAttacks(t) = #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) * CDEffectParameter(t) *
CivilDefenseTroops(t) * %OfAttacksOnInfrastructure(t)

Labor Market Sub-model
In this baseline model every member of the country’s labor force belongs to one of
eight groups. Each person is either unemployed; employed in the private sector; employed
as a trainee or active duty member of the police, the border patrol, the civil defense force,
or the indigenous military; employed in a non-security related government job; a criminal;
or an insurgent. For simplicity in the model, it has been assumed that each person in the
labor market belongs to one and only one of these categories. As the model evolves over
time, people move from one category to another as prescribed by the various rates of
change.
The previous explanation of the indigenous security institutions sub-model detailed
how people move back and forth between unemployed status and trainee and active duty
status in the border patrol, the civil defense force, and the indigenous military. The
discussion of the law enforcement sub-model explained how people transition between
unemployed status and criminal status, as well as police officer trainee status and active
duty police officer status. The presentation of the coalition military and insurgent activities
sub-model explained how people transition between unemployed status and insurgent
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status. The only aspects of the labor market that have not yet been discussed are the effects
of non-security related government jobs, private sector jobs, and the per capita gross
domestic product. Figure 3.6 shows the structure of the labor market sub-model.
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Figure 3.6: Labor Market Sub-model
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Crime Rate
Eq. 3.20

The model provides that besides getting a job in the government as a police
officer, a member of the border patrol, the civil defense force, or the indigenous military,
people can be employed in non-security related government jobs. The rate at which
people transition from unemployed status to government employee status is the
government employee hire rate. The upper bound of the government employee hire rate
is parameter controlled by the modeler, as in an occupation the occupying authority has
direct control over how many government employees it hires. At the level of fidelity of
the baseline model non-security related government employee attrition is not modeled.
Of course, this could be added if it is of interest in the operational environment being
modeled. The government employee hire rate is given by equation 3.32.
Eq. 3.32 GovernmentHireRate(t) ~ GHRDist (µ GovtHireRate (t ), σ GovtHireRate (t ) )

The distribution of the government employee hire rate depends on the situation being
modeled. A potential distribution would be the Poisson distribution as it is a discrete
distribution well suited for modeling an arrival process. If a Poisson distribution is used
the government employee hire rate would be given by equation 3.32a.
Eq. 3.32a GovernmentHireRate ~ Poisson( λGovtHireRate (t ) )

If required, a training delay similar to that seen for the security forces could be
incorporated into the hiring of non-security government employees.
The private sector hire rate represents the rate at which people transition between
unemployed status and private sector employee status. Private sector employees are
defined in this model as anyone employed by the private sector. This includes people
employed by a company that has been hired by the government to fulfill a contract, but
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does not include anyone employed directly by the government. This rate can be positive
or negative to represent an increase or decrease in the number of private sector jobs.
This initial model assumes the private sector hire rate is a function of the growth
rate of the country’s per capita gross domestic product. The relationship between the
unemployment rate and the growth rate of a country’s gross domestic product has been
well documented and is often referred to as the statistical relationship known as “Okun’s
Law” after the economist Arthur Okun who postulated the relationship in 1962
(Blanchard, 2000:25). In the paper “Potential GNP: Its Measurement and Significance”
Okun found that:
in the postwar period, on the average, each percentage point in the unemployment
rate above four percent has been associated with about a three percent decrement
in the real gross national product (1962:2).
Okun supported these findings with a regression of the unemployment rate data onto
postwar real GNP data (Okun, 1962:2).
The private sector hire rate is given by equation 3.33. This equation presents the
private sector hire rate as a function of the growth rate of the real per capita gross
domestic product, the real per capita GDP effect parameter, and the private sector hire
rate random variable.
Eq. 3.33 PrivateSectorHireRate(t) = RPerCapGDPGrowth(t) * RPerCapGDPEffectParameter(t)
* PrivateSectorHireRateRandVar(t)

The private sector hire rate random variable introduces variability into the relationship as
the real per capita GDP effect parameter is not known with certainty and fluctuates with
changes to the overall economy. The distribution of the private sector hire rate random
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variable is scenario dependent and must be chosen on the particulars of the economy
being modeled.
In their paper “On Aid, Growth and Good Policies” Carl-Johan Dalgaard and
Henrik Hansen build an econometric model of economic growth in developing countries.
In their model they represent real per capita GDP growth as a function of six factors: (1)
the country’s previous GDP, (2) the amount of civil unrest in the country, (3) the degree
to which the country is ethnically fractionalized, (4) the quality of the countries
institutions, the level of development of their financial markets, (5) the quality of the
country’s economic policy, and (6) the amount of international aid the country has
received (Dalgaard and Hansen, 2002:35). In the model developed in this thesis the
country’s real per capita GDP growth rate is represented as a function of civil unrest,
captured through the number of insurgent attacks and the crime rate, and the critical
infrastructure levels. In this first cut model, the amount of ethnic fractionalization, the
quality of institutions, financial market development, economic policy, and international
aid are all assumed to be constant throughout the course of the simulation, and as a result
are not modeled dynamically. The real per capita GDP growth rate is given by equation
3.34.
Eq. 3.34 PerCapRGDPGrowthRate(t) = RGDPRandVar(t) * (InsurgentAttacksEffectParameter(t)
* #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) + CrimeEffectParameter(t) * CrimeRate(t) +
WaterEffectParameter(t) * WaterShortage(t) + FoodEffectParameter(t) *
FoodShortage(t) + FuelEffectParameter(t)* FuelShortage(t) +
ElectricityEffectParameter(t) * ElectricityShortage(t) +
PreviousPerCapRGDPEffectParameter(t) * PreviousPerCapRGDP(t))
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In this equation the distribution of the real per capita GDP growth rate random variable is
determined by the particulars of the country being modeled and it is influenced by the
factors of ethnic fractionalization, quality of institutions, financial market development,
economic policy, and international aid. Again, greater fidelity can be added if desired in
specific applications.
Critical Infrastructure Sub-model
Critical infrastructures are important. They affect local population’s opinion of
the occupation, and the growth rate of the economy. Which infrastructures are critical
depends on the exact scenario being modeled. In order to model a particular situation
more or less critical infrastructures may need to be added or deleted from the general
model presented here.
In the generic model developed in this thesis four infrastructures are included in
the critical infrastructure sub-model: (1) potable water, (2) food, (3) fuel, and (4)
electricity. The critical infrastructures were selected based on the assumption that in
general they are essential for preventing humanitarian crisis or social unrest within the
population. The level value of each of these infrastructures is measured in units delivered.
It is this quantity of the critical resource ultimately delivered as compared to the quantity
demanded that is assumed to be important in this model. No distinction is made in this
baseline model between a shortage of a critical resource due to insufficient production or
insufficient distribution. For instance, no distinction is made between a shortage of
potable water do to an insufficient water treatment infrastructure or a shortage of potable
water do to an insufficient water distribution infrastructure. In both cases the critical

54

resource is ultimately not delivered and the effects on public opinion and economic
activity are the same.
The model assumes the demands for the critical resources are exogenous and set
by the modeler to levels appropriate for modeling the scenario in question. The critical
resource shortage/surplus amounts are functions of the quantity delivered of the critical
resource and the quantity demanded. The shortage/surplus amounts for water, food, fuel,
and electricity are given by equations 3.35, 3.36, 3.37, and 3.38 respectively.
Eq. 3.35 WaterShortage/Surplus(t) =
GallonsOfWaterDelivered(t) – GallonsOfWaterDemanded(t)
Eq. 3.36 FoodShortage/Surplus(t) =
TonsOfFoodDelivered(t) - TonsOfFoodDemanded(t)
Eq. 3.37 FuelShortage/Surplus(t) =
GallonsOfFuelDelivered(t) - GallonsOfFuelDemanded(t)
Eq 3.38 ElectricityShortage/Surplus(t) =
MegaWattDelivered(t) – MegaWattDemanded(t)

A possible expansion to the model would be to make the demand for resources a function
of the per capita GDP so that as the economy grows and the standard of living rises
demand for resources such as electricity and fuel also grow. Another possible expansion
would be to include the transportation infrastructure and communications infrastructure
among the critical infrastructures. These were not included in this version of the model
as they are not as critical for preventing humanitarian crises as water, food, fuel, and
electricity. However, they are important for generating sustained economic growth, and
should be included in a more comprehensive model.
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The development rates for the four critical infrastructures are modeled as
functions of the baseline development rate, the number of insurgent infrastructure attacks,
and the levels of other relevant critical infrastructures. The baseline development rate is
an input. It represents an assumed potential development rate under peaceful conditions.
The number of insurgent infrastructure attacks represents the daily number of insurgent
attacks on the critical infrastructure and has been discussed in greater detail in the
explanation of the insurgent and coalition military actions sub-model. The development
rates of each of the critical infrastructures are also influenced by the levels of some of the
other related critical infrastructures. These interrelations are dependent on the exact
scenario being modeled, and have to be tailored to fit the particular country of interest.
For the purpose of explaining the general model some potential relationships are
identified.
The water development rate is the rate of change of the gallons of water
distributed daily. It is a function of the baseline water development rate, the number of
insurgent infrastructure attacks, and the electricity shortage/surplus level as water pumps
and purification facilities often need electricity to function. The water development rate
is given by Equation 3.39.
Eq. 3.39 WaterDevelopmentRate(t) = BaseWaterDevelopmentRate(t) *
(InfrastructureAttackWaterEffectParameter(t) * #OfInfrastructureAttacks(t) +
ElectricShortageEffectParameter(t) * ElectricShortage(t))

The food development rate is the rate of change of the tons of food delivered daily.
It is a function of the baseline food development rate, the number of insurgent
infrastructure attacks, and the fuel shortage/surplus level. The food development rate is a
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function of the fuel shortage/surplus level because the food distribution networks in many
countries rely of fuel powered truck transportation and a significant shortage of fuel
could negatively impact the food delivery infrastructure. The food development rate is
given by equation 3.40.
Eq. 3.40 FoodDevelopmentRate(t) = BaseFoodDevelopmentRate(t) *
(InfrastructureAttackFoodEffectParameter(t) * #OfInfrastructureAttacks(t) +
FuelShortageEffectParameter(t) * FuelShortage(t))

The fuel development rate is the rate of change of the gallons of fuel delivered
daily. It is a function of the baseline fuel development rate, the number of insurgent
infrastructure attacks, and the electric shortage/surplus, as oil refineries and fuel
distribution infrastructures often cannot function at full capacity without electricity. The
fuel development rate is given by equation 3.41.
Eq. 3.41 FuelDevelopmentRate(t) = BaseFuelDevelopmentRate(t) *
(InfrastructureAttackFuelEffectParameter(t) * #OfInfrastructureAttacks(t) +
ElectricShortageEffectParameter(t) * ElectricShortage(t))

The electric development rate is the rate of change of the number of mega watt
hours delivered daily. It is a function of the baseline electric development rate and the
number of insurgent infrastructure attacks. The electric development rate is given by
equation 3.42.
Eq. 3.42 ElectricDevelopmentRate = BaseElectricDevelopmentRate(t) *
InfrastructureAttackElectricEffectParameter(t) * #OfInfrastructureAttacks(t)

The overall structure of the critical infrastructure sub-model is given in figure 3.7.
Clearly, other key infrastructures could be modeled, such as fire protection, education,
and health services, for example. While they have not been included in the initial model,
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they could be incorporated into the model as required by the situation being investigated
and the fidelity needed to meet the analysis requirements.
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Public Opinion Sub-model
The public opinion sub-model influences the rest of the model in two ways. The
number of people who are dissatisfied with the occupation influences the insurgent rate
of change, and the number of people who are neutral to or satisfied with the occupation
influences the number of tips the indigenous population gives on insurgent activities.
Figure 3.8 gives the overall structure of the public opinion sub-model.
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Figure 3.8: Public Opinion Sub-model

The public opinion rate of change is a function of seven variables: (1) the number
of unemployed people, (2) the number of daily insurgent attacks, (3) the crime rate, and
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the shortage/surpluses of the critical resources of (4) water, (5) food, (6) fuel, and (7)
electricity. The Public opinion rate of change is given by equation 3.43.
Eq. 3.43 PublicOpinionRateOfChange(t) = UnemploymentEffectParameter(t)*
UnemploymentLevel(t) + InsurgentAttacksEffectParameter(t) * InsurgentAttacks(t) +
CrimeRateEffectParameter(t) * CrimeRate(t) +
WaterShortage/SurplusEffectParameter(t) * WaterShortage/Surplus(t) +
FoodShortage/SurplusEffectParameter(t) * FoodShortage/Surplus(t) +
FuelShortage/SurplusEffectParameter(t) * FuelShortage/Surplus(t) +
ElectricShortage/SurplusEffectParameter(t) * ElectricShortage/Surplus(t)

The number of tips on insurgent activity is the daily number of useful tips the
coalition receives on insurgent activity. This number is a function of the number of
people who are neutral to or satisfied with the occupation. The more tips the coalition
troops receive on insurgent activity the more effective they are at apprehending members
of the insurgency. The number of tips on insurgent activity is given by equation 3.44.
Eq. 3.44 TipsOnInsurgents(t) = #OfPeopleSatisfiedWithOccupation(t) * TipsRandomVariable(t)

The tips random variable is a number between zero and one that represents how many
tips each satisfied or neutral person makes on insurgent activity each day. The
distribution of this random variable depends on the specifics of the scenario being
modeled and an appropriate distribution must be chosen to fit the situation of interest. An
obvious extension would be the inclusion of a local and international media effect and
coalition psychological operations, for example. Each of these effects is an area for
further research.
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Summary
The general form of the proposed systems dynamics based model for simulating
the establishment of security in a post conflict reconstruction is proposed. The model is
divided into six sub-models: indigenous security forces, law enforcement, insurgent and
coalition military activity, labor market, critical infrastructures, and public opinion. The
interactions and time dependent functional forms of the rates of change associated with
each of the 23 level variables in the general model are identified.
While any number of different variables and levels of fidelity could be added to
this initial model, it should be recalled that the goal of the thesis is to show the viability
of this approach. The base model is populated with scenario specific data and analyzed
in chapter four as a demonstration of the viability of this approach.
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IV. Illustration

Notional Scenario: Regime Change
Chapter III discussed a general form of the post-conflict stability operations
model developed in this work. This chapter demonstrates how the general model can be
applied to investigate a specific scenario. This is done by first sketching a notional
example of a post-conflict stability operation. The general form of the post-conflict
stability operations model was then applied to model this notional scenario, and the
results of the simulation are presented and analyzed.
This notional regime change scenario, based on the 2003 overthrow of the
Baathist regime in Iraq, investigates key factors to the establishment of stability. In this
notional scenario, a coalition, including the United States, has determined that the
government of Iraq posed a threat to security in the world, and that a regime change in
Iraq was of vital interest. As a result of this vital interest, an international coalition force
was formed to enforce a regime change in Iraq. After a rapid air campaign and land
invasion, the Iraqi government collapsed.
Day zero for this notional analysis is assumed to be the day the coalition forces
captured Baghdad. The objective of the analysis was to identify influential factors that
can be used to investigate policy alternatives with respect to the length of time required to
establish security in the aftermath of the Baathist regime collapse. This was
accomplished through first initializing the parameters of the basic stability operations
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model described in Chapter III, inputting appropriate distributions and parameters, and
then performing a screening experiment that identifies influential factors.
Variables
As in the general post-conflict stability operations model, the variables are used to
measure the state of the stability operation in six critical areas: (1) Iraqi security
institutions, (2) law enforcement, (3) the Iraqi labor market, (4) insurgent and coalition
military activity, (5) critical infrastructures, and (6) Iraqi public opinion. These variables
are summarized in table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Summary of Variables in the Notional Regime Change Scenario
Sub-model

Iraqi Security Forces

Law Enforcement

Iraqi Labor Market

Insurgent and Coalition
Military Activities

Critical Infrastructures
Iraqi Public Opinion

State Variable
# of Iraqi Border Police
# of Iraqi Civil Defense Personnel
# of Iraqi Military Personnel
# of Facility Protection Service Personnel
# of Iraqi Border Police in Training
# of Iraqi Civil Defense Personnel in Training
# of Iraqi Military Personnel in Training
# of Facility Protection Service Personnel in Training
# of Iraqi Police Officers
# of Iraqi Police Officers in Training
# of Coalition Troops Working in Law Enforcement
# of Criminals in Iraq
# of Incarcerated Criminals in Iraq
# of Unemployed Iraqis
# of Non-Security Related Government Employees
# of Private Sector Employees
Iraq's Per Capita Gross Domestic Product
# of Insurgents
# of Detained Insurgents
Total Number of Coalition Troops in Iraq
# of Coalition Troops Securing Iraq's Borders
# of Coalition Troops Conducting Counter Insurgency Operations
Daily Gallons of Potable Water Distributed
Daily number of Megawatts of Electricity Delivered
Barrels of Oil Produced Per Day
Iraqis Dissatisfied With the Coalition
Iraqis Neutral to or Satisfied With the Coalition
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The capacity of the Iraqi security institutions are measured by eight variables: (1)
the number of Iraqi border patrol personnel, (2) the number of Iraqi civil defense force
personnel, (3) the number of Iraqi military personnel, (4) the number of facility
protection service personnel, (5) the number of Iraqi border patrol personnel in training,
(6) the number of Iraqi civil defense personnel in training, (7) the number of Iraqi
military personnel in training, and (8) the number of facility protection service personnel
in training.
The state of law enforcement in Iraq is measured by five variables: (1) the number
of Iraqi police officers, (2) the number of Iraqi police officers in training, (3) the number
of coalition troops working in a law enforcement capacity, (4) the number of criminals in
Iraq, and (5) the number of incarcerated criminals in Iraq.
The state of the Iraqi labor market is measured by four variables: (1) unemployed
Iraqis, (2) non-military non-police government employees, (3) private sector employees,
and (4) Iraq’s per capita gross domestic product.
Insurgent activity in Iraq is measured by two variables: (1) the number of
insurgents in Iraq and (2) the number of detained insurgents. Regardless of their
motivation, anyone in Iraq working to thwart the coalition through violent means is
considered an insurgent. Coalition troop activity is measured by three variables: (1) the
total number of coalition troops in Iraq, (2) the number of coalition troops patrolling
Iraq’s borders, and (3) the number of coalition troops conducting counter-insurgency
operations.
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Iraq’s critical infrastructures included in this scenario are water distribution,
electricity, and fuel production and distribution. While there are other important
infrastructures in Iraq, Pollack suggests these three are critical (Pollak, 2004:2). Iraq’s
critical infrastructure will be measured by three variables: (1) the daily gallons of potable
water distributed, (2) the daily number of megawatt hours of electricity being delivered in
Iraq, and (3) the number of barrels of crude oil per day produced in Iraq.
Public opinion in Iraq is measured by two variables: (1) the number of Iraqis
dissatisfied with the coalition’s occupation and (2) the number of Iraqis neutral to or
satisfied with the coalition’s occupation.
The Rates of Change
Taken together the 27 level values identified in the preceding section describe the
state of the stability operation and its environment. However, by themselves these level
values do not develop dynamically. Each level value has one or more rates of change
associated with it. These rates of change determine how the level values evolve over
time. The level values, coupled with the rates of change, capture how the entire system
evolves through time. The overall model of the stability operation in Iraq is divided into
the six sub-models in the general model: (1) Iraqi security institutions, (2) law
enforcement, (3) the Iraqi labor market, (4) insurgent and coalition military activity, (5)
critical infrastructures, and (6) Iraqi public opinion. The specific equations that
determine the rates of change in these six sub-models are explained in the following
sections.

65

Iraqi Security Institutions
In post-conflict Iraq the coalition has worked to increase the capacity of the Iraqi
security institutions (Swannack,2003:3). It has done this through the standing up of four
security services: (1) the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, (2) the Facility Protection Service,
(3) the Iraqi Border Police, and (4) the Iraqi Army.
The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) soldiers are Iraqis who are integrated into
coalition military units “to gather intelligence, run combat patrols in the city, establish
fixed-site security positions, and conduct raids and cordon search operations” (Miles,
2003:1). Recruits for the ICDC enter an intensive three week combat training program
where they learn troop-leading procedures, crowd and riot control, and how to operate an
AK-47 assault rifle (Miles, 2003:2). As of the end of January 2004 the ICDC had 19,800
troops, with an eventual goal of 40,000 troops (Brookings Institution, 2004:11).
In this model the training capacity for the ICDC is assumed to be a maximum of
three classes of 1,000 trainees each. This training rate is consistent with standing up
20,000 troops in six months, with a three week training program, and a 25% attrition rate.
The daily recruiting rate for the ICDC is about 143 troops for a weekly rate of 1000. The
Daily recruit rate for the ICDC is given by equation 4.1a and 4.1b. In this notional
example the ICDCRecruitRate is a function of time, the ICDC class size, the number of
classes that can be trained concurrently, and the class length.
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Eq. 4.1a ICDCRecruitRate(t) =
(ICDCClassSize(t) * #OfICDCClasses(t)) /ClassLength(t)
where ICDCClassSize(t) is computed based on the end goal of 20000 in six months for
this example such that
(ICDCClassSize(t) * #OfICDCClasses(t)) /ClassLength(t)*(#Days / Week)
* #Weeks * (1-E(ICDCTrainingAttrition(t))) = #OfDesired ICDC Personnel
((ICDCClassSize(t) * 3) / 21)*(7 / Week)* 26 * (0.75) = 20000
ICDCClassSize(t) ≈ 1000
Eq. 4.1b ICDCRecruitRate(t) = (1000 * 3) / 21 = 143

The attrition rate for the ICDC training program is assumed to be similar to the
attrition rate for the Iraqi Army training program and is given by the variable
ICDCTrainingAttrition which is assumed to be a triangularly distributed random variable
with a minimum of 0, a mean of 0.25, and a maximum of 0.5. The attrition rate of the
Iraqi Army training program and the selection of this distribution is discussed later in this
section. The ICDC trainees who do not graduate the program return to unemployed
status at the end of the training program. The generic graduation rate for the ICDC is
given by equation 4.2a while the expression used in the scenario is given by 4.2b. The
ICDC training graduation rate is a function of the time period, the ICDCTrainingAttrition,
and the training class length.
Eq. 4.2a ICDCGraduationRate(t) =
⎧ClassSize(t ) * (1 − ICDCTrainingAttrition(t ) ) if StartDate + ClassLength(t ) = CurrentDate
⎨
otherwise
⎩0

Eq. 4.2b ICDCGraduationRate(t) =
⎧1000 * (1 − ICDCTrainingAttrition(t ) ) if StartDate + 21 = CurrentDate
⎨
otherwise
⎩0
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Garamone has stated that active duty attrition has not been a problem with the
security services in Iraq (Garamone, 2003:1). For this reason the active duty attrition rate
parameter for the ICDC in this notional analysis, given by equation 4.3, is assumed to be
a Poisson distributed random variable with a mean and variance of zero.
Eq. 4.3 ICDCAttritionRate(t) ~ Poisson(ICDCAttritionRateParameter(t))
Where
ICDCAttritionRateParameter(t) = 0

The ICDCAttritionRate is a function of the time period. In this notional example the
ICDCAttritionRate has been effectively set at 0 for all time periods. However, another
distribution could be used to fit the scenario being investigated.
The Iraqi Army undergoes a similar training program to the ICDC. The Army is
trained at the battalion level. About 1000 recruits enter each class to produce an active
battalion of 757 troops (Eaton, 2004:2). Officers, non-commissioned officers, and
enlisted men are first trained separately. They are then all integrated and train together
for three additional weeks before they graduate and enter active duty (Eaton, 2004:3).
The coalition has the capacity to train three battalions simultaneously (Eaton, 2004:3).
As of the end of January three battalions had graduated and three more were being
trained (Eaton, 2004:3). The coalition plans to use these first battalions as a cadre that
will eventually train more units until the goal of nine infantry brigades of three battalions
each is reached (Eaton, 2004:2;Combined Joint Task Force 7, 2003:2). Attrition for the
Iraqi Army training program has been as high as 50%, but generally has averaged about
between 20% and 25%, which the Army has said is a typical attrition rate based on the
type of recruiting and training involved (Eaton, 2004:13). The attrition rate for the Iraqi
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Army training program in this notional scenario is given by the variable
IMilTrainingAttrition and has been modeled as a triangularly distributed random variable
with a minimum of 0, a mean of 0.25, and a maximum of 0.5, to reflect the attrition rates
observed in the Iraqi Army training program.
This model assumes that the coalition is able to induce as many Iraqis to join the
Army as can be trained. In order to keep a 60 day training program with three classes of
1000 recruits each full, 50 trainees need to be recruited each day. The Iraqi Army
recruitment rate is given by equation 4.4a and 4.4b.
Eq. 4.4a IraqiArmyRecruitRate(t)=
(IMilClassSize(t) * #OfIMilClasses(t))/ClassLength(t)
Eq. 4.4b IraqiArmyRecruitRate(t) = ( 1000 * 3 ) / 60 = 50

The graduation rate for the Iraqi Army is given by equations 4.5a and 4.5b.
Eq. 4.5a IraqiArmyGraduationRate(t) =
⎧ClassSize(t ) * (1 − IMilTrainingAttrition(t ) ) if StartDate + ClassLength(t ) = CurrentDate
⎨
otherwise
⎩0

Eq. 4.5b IraqiArmyGraduationRate(t) =
⎧1000 * (1 − IMilTrainingAttrition(t ) ) if StartDate + 60 = CurrentDate
⎨
otherwise
⎩0

News reports have suggested that active duty attrition has not been a problem
with the security services in Iraq (Garamone, 2003:1). As a result the attrition rate
parameter for the Iraqi Army in this scenario, given by equation 4.6, is assumed to be
zero.
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Eq. 4.6 IraqiArmyAttritionRate(t) ~ Poisson(IraqiArmyAttritionRateParameter(t))
Where
IraqiArmyAttritionRateParameter(t) = 0

The Facility Protection Service (FPS) personnel go through a three day training
course before they are used to guard government buildings and facilities (Ministry of
Interior, 2004:5). The training course includes “instruction in hand-to-hand combat,
weapons familiarization, professional conduct, and personal interaction” (DoD, 2003:4).
This very short training course has enabled the coalition to quickly train a large number
of FPS troops. By the beginning of February 2004 there were 97,800 FPS personnel
working throughout Iraq (Brookings Institution, 2004:11).
This notional analysis assumes that the coalition can train three classes of 1000
FPS recruits simultaneously, and that it can induce enough Iraqis to enroll in the training
program to keep all the classes full. The FPS recruitment rate required to keep these
classes full is given generally by equation 4.7a and specifically for this scenario by 4.7b
and is 1000 new recruits per day.
Eq. 4.7a FPSRecruitRate(t) =( ClassSize(t) * #OfClasses(t))/ClassLength(t)
Eq. 4.7b FPSRecruitRate(t)= (1000*3) / 3 = 1000

The attrition rate for the FPS training program is given by the variable
FPSTrainingAttrition and is assumed to be a triangularly distributed random variable
with a minimum of 0, a mean of 0.25, and a maximum of 0.5. The graduation rate for the
FPS is stated in general by equation 4.8a and is reexpressed for this specific excersice in
4.8b.
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Eq. 4.8a FPSGraduationRate(t) =
⎧ClassSize(t ) * (1 − FPSTrainingAttrition(t ) ) if StartDate + ClassLength(t ) = CurrentDate
⎨
otherwise
⎩0

Eq. 4.8b FPSGraduationRate(t) =
⎧1000 * (1 − FPSTrainingAttrition(t ) ) if StartDate + 3 = CurrentDate
⎨
otherwise
⎩0

Continuing with the assumption that active duty attrition has not been a problem
for the security services in Iraq, the active duty attrition rate for the FPS in this model,
given by equation 4.9, is also set to be zero (Garamone,2003:1).
Eq. 4.9 FPSAttritionRate(t) ~ Poisson(FPSAttritionRateParameter(t) )
Where
FPSAttritionRateParameter(t) = 0

The Iraqi Border Police initially go through the standard eight week police
training program followed by “an additional two weeks of post academy training
specifically tailored for border police officers” (Ministry of Interior, 2004:4). By the
beginning of February 2004 there were 21,000 Iraqi Border Police working to secure
Iraq’s borders (Brookings Institution, 2004:11). The eventual goal is a force of 25,000
border police (Brookings Institution, 2004:11).
For this notional example it is assumed that ten classes of 1,000 Iraqi Border
Police trainees can be trained simultaneously, and that there are enough recruits to fill
these classes. This assumption is based on the open source data available on the training
rates of Iraqi Border Police (Brookings Institution, 2004:11). Of course, these parameters
can be modified to fit the scenario being modeled. For this scenario the Iraqi Border
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Police recruit rate is given in general by equation 4.10a and tailored for this analysis in
4.10b.
Eq. 4.10a IBPRecruitRate(t) = (ClassSize(t) * #OfClasses(t))/ClassLength(t)
Eq. 4.10b IBPRecruitRate(t) = ( 1000 * 10 ) / 70 = 143

The attrition rate for the Iraqi Border Police training program is given by the
variable IBPTrainingAttrition and is assumed to be a triangularly distributed random
variable with a minimum of 0, a mean of 0.25, and a maximum of 0.5. The graduation
rate for the Iraqi Border Police is given by equation 4.11.
Eq. 4.11a IBPGraduationRate(t) =
⎧ClassSize(t ) * (1 − IBPTrainingAttrition(t ) ) if StartDate + ClassLength(t ) = CurrentDate
⎨
otherwise
⎩0

Eq. 4.11b IBPGraduationRate(t) =
⎧1000 * (1 − IBPTrainingAttrition(t ) ) if StartDate + 70 = CurrentDate
⎨
otherwise
⎩0

The active duty attrition rate parameter for the Iraqi Border Police in this notional
example is given by equation 4.12 and is assumed to be zero, based on news reports of
the active duty attrition rates of the Iraqi security forces (Garamone, 2003:1).
Eq. 4.12 IBPAttritionRate(t) ~ Poisson(IBPAttritionRateParameter(t))
Where
IBPAttritionRateParameter(t) = 0

Open source data is not available for the number of casualties of each Iraqi
security service, but the Brookings Institution gives a rough estimate that about 200 Iraqi
security service personnel were killed in the months of December 2003 and January 2004
(2004:4). In the same months Iraq’s security services were typically attacked two to four
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times per day nationwide (Brookings Institution, 2004:7). If over a two month period the
Iraqi security services were attacked three times per day and there was, on average, one
casualty per attack there would be close to 200 casualties over that time period. This is
consistent with the limited open source data available on the number of Iraqi security
force casualties. In this scenario the daily number of casualties in the Iraqi security
forces is assumed to be a Poisson distributed random variable with a mean of one times
that day’s number of insurgent attacks against Iraqi security forces. The daily Iraqi
security force casualties are then randomly applied to one of the four security forces or
the Iraqi Police. The Iraqi Police are discussed in the following section, and the number
of insurgent attacks on Iraqi security forces are discussed in the insurgent and coalition
military section. The daily casualty rate for the Iraqi security forces is given by Equation
4.13.
Eq. 4.13 IraqiSecurityForceCasualties(t) ~ Poisson(InsurgentAttacksOnIraqiSF(t))

Law Enforcement
Establishing law and order is critical in Iraq. “The fear Iraqis have of crime and
lawlessness is, without question, the single greatest impediment to social, political, and
economic reconstruction in Iraq today” (Pollak, 2004:12). If the coalition is unable to
solve Iraq’s crime problems then ordinary Iraqis may “seek protection behind local
militias of one sort or another—which would spell the end of reconstruction and be the
first step on the road to civil war” (Pollak, 2004:12).
The cornerstone of the coalition’s strategy to enforce law and order in Iraq is the
Iraqi Police Service. The Iraqi Police Service recruits new police officers and
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experienced police officers. New police officers undergo an eight week training program
(Interior Ministry, 2004:1). It is assumed in this illustrative example that the new police
officer training course can train three classes of 1,500 recruits each simultaneously, and
that there is a four day lag between the end of training and when new police officers enter
active duty. Experienced police officers undergo a three week training program to
educate recruits on “international standards of human rights, modern policing techniques,
and Iraqi criminal law and procedure” (Interior Ministry, 2004:1). The three week
training program can train 3,000 recruits simultaneously (Interior Ministry, 2004:1). In
this scenario it is assumed that the 3,000 recruits are trained in concurrent classes of
1,000 recruits each.
This analysis assumes that the coalition can recruit enough trainees to keep both
of these training programs full. That translates to 75 new trainees and 143 experienced
trainees recruited each day. The new and experienced Iraqi police officer trainee
recruitment rates are given by equations 4.14 and 4.15 respectively.
Eq. 4.14a NewIPORecruitRate(t) = (ClassSize(t) * #OfClasses(t))/ClassLength(t)
Eq. 4.14b NewIPORecruitRate(t) = (1500 * 3 ) / 60 = 75
Eq. 4.15a ExperiencedIPORecruitRate(t) = (ClassSize(t) * #OfClasses(t))/ClassLength(t)
Eq. 4.15b ExperiencedIPORecruitRate(t) = ( 1000 * 3 ) / 21 = 143

The attrition rates for both of these programs are NewIPOTrainingAttritionRate and
EIPOTrainingAttritionRate, respectively. It has been assumed that these values are
triangularly distributed random variables with minimum values of 0, means of 0.25, and
maximum values of 0.5. The Iraqi police officer graduation rate is the sum of the new
police officer training program graduation rate and the experienced police officer training
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program graduation rate. It is given in general by equation 4.16a and specifically for this
scenario in 4.16b.
Eq. 4.16a IPOGradRate(t) = NewIPOGradRate(t) + ExperiencedIPOGradRate(t)
Where
NewIPOGradRate(t)=
⎧ClassSize(t ) * (1 − NewIPOTrainingAttrition(t ) ) if StartDate + ClassLength(t ) = CurrentDate
⎨
otherwise
⎩0

ExperiencedIPOGradRate(t)=
⎧ClassSize (t ) * (1 − EIPOTrainingAttrition(t ) ) if StartDate + ClassLength(t ) = CurrentDate
⎨
otherwise
⎩0

Eq. 4.16b IPOGradRate(t) = NewIPOGradRate(t) + ExperiencedIPOGradRate(t)
Where
NewIPOGradRate(t)= ⎧⎨1500 * (1 − NewIPOTrainingAttrition(t ) ) if StartDate + 60 = CurrentDate
otherwise
⎩0
ExperiencedIPOGradRate(t)=
⎧1000 * (1 − EIPOTrainingAttrition(t ) ) if StartDate + 21 = CurrentDate
⎨
otherwise
⎩0

In this model active duty attrition is assumed to not be a problem. An interesting addition
to the model would be to make the active duty attrition rate a dynamic function of the
police officer casualty rate, the salary paid police officers, and the police officer work
load.
Eq. 4.17 IPOAttritionRate(t) ~ Poisson(IPOAttritionRateParameter(t))
Where
IPOAttritionRateParameter(t) = 0

The criminal recruitment rate is the rate at which unemployed people stop looking
for jobs and start supporting themselves through crime. In this notional scenario it has
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been assumed that every day between two and three unemployed people per thousand
become criminals. Of those people who become criminals or who already are criminals,
two criminals per criminal apprehended the previous day leave criminal status and return
to unemployed status. The criminal recruitment rate assumed by this model is given by
equation 4.18.
Eq. 4.18 CriminalRecruitRate(t) = ( U 1 * UnemploymentLevel – CAppEffectParameter*
CriminalApprehensionRate CurrentDay −1 ) * T1
Where

U1 ~ Uniform(0.002,0.003)
CAppEffectParameter = 2

T1 ~ Triangular(.5,1,1.5)

While there is evidence that suggests that the rate at which people choose to become
criminals is affected by their economic situation and their probability of apprehension,
the exact relationship given above is notional (Neumayer, 2003:635). Further research
needs to be done to investigate the validity of this notional relationship. As a result of
this uncertainty the criminal recruitment rate varies by plus or minus 50%.
The criminal apprehension rate is assumed to be the rate at which criminals are
arrested by Iraqi police, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, and coalition military forces
conducting crime suppression operations. According to FBI data on reported crimes and
arrests in 59 large U.S. cities, about 20% of reported violent crimes result in an arrest
(Levitt, 1995:32). The stated goal of the coalition is to ultimately train a force of about
110,000 police and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps personnel to maintain law and order in Iraq
(Brookings Institution, 2004:11). This scenario assumes that 110,000 police and ICDC
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personnel will be able to achieve a similar ratio of arrests per criminals. This similar
ratio of arrests can be approximately attained if each group of 11,000 police and ICDC
personnel in this scenario can apprehend between one and three percent of the criminals
in Iraq each day, never exceeding one arrest per ten police and ICDC personnel. The
criminal apprehension rate is then given by equation 4.19.
Eq. 4.19 CriminalApprehensionRate(t) = Criminals(t) *
(

IPOLevel (t ) + ICDCLevel (t ) + CoalitionMilitaryPolicing (t ) * U
)
1
PoliceForceEffectParameter (t )

Such that

CriminalApprehensionRate(t) ≤
(

IPOLevel (t ) + ICDCLevel (t ) + CoalitionMilitaryPolicing (t )
)
MinPoliceToCaptureACri min al (t )

PoliceForceEffectParameter(t) = 1
U 1 ~ Uniform(0.01,0.03)

MinPoliceToCaptureACriminal(t) = 10

The criminal apprehension rate given in equation 4.19 is notional. Further research is
needed to determine the actual apprehension rate.
The criminal release rate gives the rate at which criminals who have been arrested
are released back into the general population. This rate includes people who were
arrested and released because they were found to be innocent, people who were arrested
stood trial and were acquitted, and people who were arrested convicted and have finished
their sentences. This scenario assumes that every day between zero and five percent of
the incarcerated criminals are released into the pool of unemployed persons. Equation
4.20 gives the criminal release rate.
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Eq. 4.20

CriminalReleaseRate(t) = (IncarceratedCriminalsLevel(t) ) ⋅ U 1

Where
U 1 ~ Uniform(0,0.05)

This release rate is notional and can be adjusted to various levels to simulate alternative
levels of prosecutorial effectiveness and punishment severity.
A lack of reliable open source data exists on the crime rate in post-conflict Iraq.
The Brookings Institute reports that one of the few open source statistics that was
available between May 2003 and January 2004 is a rough estimate of the number of
crime related deaths in Baghdad (Brookings Institute, 2004:12). This number was
calculated based on the number of bodies with fatal gunshot wounds brought to morgues
in the Baghdad area, recognizing that not all bodies brought to morgues are victims and
not all victims are brought to morgues (Brookings institution, 2004:12). The scenario
analyzed here uses the number of crime related deaths as a proxy for the violent crime
rate. It is assumed that each criminal and insurgent is responsible for an average of
between 0.25 and one crime related deaths each year. Included in this rate is also the
casualty rate of Iraqi security forces, and deaths as a result of insurgent attacks on the
civilian population. In this notional example it is assumed that on average 20 civilians
are killed as a result of each insurgent attack on the civilian population. The crime
related death rate is given by equation 4.21 and is calculated as a proxy for the amount of
crime in Iraq. The ISF casualty rate is applied to the Iraqi security force levels in the
Iraqi security forces sub model.
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Eq. 4.21 CrimeRelatedDeathRate(t) =
(

1 * (Criminals(t) + Insurgents(t)) * U + ISFCasualtyRate(t)+ P
)
1
1
365

Where
U 1 ~ Uniform(0.25,1)
P1 ~ Poisson(InsurgentAttackCivEffectParameter(t)*InsurgentAttacksCivilians(t))

InsurgentAttackCivEffectParameter(t) = 20

The last equation in the law enforcement sub-model describes the number of
coalition troops that are being used to conduct crime suppression operations. Pollack
reports that in Iraq from May 2003 to January 2004 few coalition forces were employed
in crime suppression operations (Pollak, 2004:13). It is assumed in this notional scenario
that 5% of coalition troops are employed in crime suppression operations as shown in
equation 4.22.
Eq. 4.22 CoalitionTroopsPolicing(t) =

%OfCoalitionTroopsSupressingCrime(t)*TotalCoalitionTroops(t)
Where
%OfCoalitionTroopsSupressingCrime(t) = .05

Insurgent and Coalition Military Activities

Insurgent and coalition military activities are represented in this scenario by three
level values and six rates of change. The level values are the number of coalition troops
in Iraq, the assumed number of insurgents in Iraq, and the number of insurgents being
detained by the coalition. The rates of change are: (1) the coalition troop rate of change,
(2) the coalition troop casualty rate, (3) the insurgent recruitment rate, (4) the
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international insurgent rate of change, (5) the insurgent apprehension rate, and (6) the
detained insurgent release rate.
The coalition troop level is influenced by two rates of change: (1) the coalition
troops in country rate of change and (2) the coalition troop casualty rate. The coalition
troop rate of change represents the rate at which coalition troops are arriving or departing
the country, and the coalition casualty rate is the rate at which coalition troops are being
killed or wounded. These two rates can be set at different levels to investigate the effects
of a troop build-up or a troop draw-down. For this scenario run the number of coalition
troops in Iraq was be held constant by setting the coalition troop rate of change equal to
the coalition troop casualty rate. The coalition troop rate of change is given by equation
4.23.
Eq. 4.23 CoalitionTroopRateOfChange(t) = CoalitionTroopCasualtyRate(t)

This formulation of the CoalitionTroopRateOfChange effectively maintains the coalition
troop manning level.
The coalition troop casualty rate is a function of the number of insurgent attacks
that are made on coalition troops. According to the Brookings Institute, in the months of
August 2003 through January 2004 an average of five fatalities resulted from each 100
attacks on U.S. troops, with an average of eight troops wounded for each fatality
(Brookings Institution, 2004:3-6). Therefore, on the average there were 0.4 casualties per
attack on U.S. troops. In this example it has been assumed that all coalition troops have a
similar average casualties per attack, and that the coalition troop casualties per attack is a
Poisson distributed random variable with a mean of 0.4 times the daily number of
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insurgent attacks against coalition troops. For this scenario the coalition troop casualty
rate is given by equation 4.24.
Eq. 4.24 CoalitionTroopCasualtyRate(t) ~
Poisson(AvgCasualtiesPerAttack(t) * #OfInsurgentAttacksOnCoalitionTroops(t))
Where

AvgCasualtiesPerAttack(t) = 0.4

The insurgent recruitment rate is the rate at which people transition from
unemployed status to insurgent status. For this analysis insurgents are defined as anyone,
regardless of their motivation, attempting to thwart the coalition through violent means.
In the case of Iraq some of the people attempting to thwart the coalition through violence
are motivated by political beliefs, some by religious beliefs, some by the potential for
financial gain, and some by a combination of these three. In this analysis all of these
people are included in the insurgent category.
Similar to how the criminal recruitment rate was modeled in the law enforcement
sub-model, in this notional example every day between two and three people per 10,000
who have become dissatisfied with the occupation consider joining the insurgency.
There is no open source data on the rate at which people join the insurgency so this
number has been approximated based on monthly estimates of insurgent strength reported
by the Brookings Institution (2004:10). Of the people who either are considering
becoming insurgents or already are insurgents, a percentage of them reconsider their
decision and decide not to participate in the insurgency. The total number of insurgents
who reconsider is a function of the number of insurgents captured the previous day. As a
result the insurgent recruitment rate can be negative. A negative insurgent recruitment
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rate would represent people choosing to leave the insurgency and transition to
unemployed status. The insurgent recruitment rate is given by equation 4.25.
Eq. 4.25 InsurgentRecruitmentRate(t) = ( U 1 * DissatisfiedPeople(t) U 2 *InsurgentKilledOrDetainedRate CurrentDay −1 ) * T1

Where
U 1 ~ Uniform(0.0002,0.0003)
U 2 ~ Uniform(0,1)

T1 ~ Triangular(0.5,1,1.5)

Formulating the insurgent recruitment rate as a function of the number of dissatisfied
people and the insurgent apprehension rate is consistent with the research done by
Epstein, Steinbruner, and Parker (2001:3-5). Epstein, Steinbruner, and Parker, in an
agent based simulation on civil violence, made the choice of whether each agent revolted
or not based on, among other things, that agent’s level of grievance and their perceived
chance of being arrested for revolting (2001:3-5). Because of the uncertainty of the
insurgent recruitment rate, it has been allowed to vary by plus or minus 50%.
The international insurgent rate of change depicts the rate at which people are
coming to Iraq to join the insurgency. The number of international insurgent that try to
enter Iraq is assumed to be determined by social and political dynamics that are
exogenous to the model. In a statement made on 19 December 2003, the U.S. military
said that of the almost 9,000 suspected insurgents it has detained, about 200 to 300 of
them were foreign nationals (Kimmitt, 2003:9). In addition, it has been estimated that
about 90% of the insurgents in Iraq are former regime loyalists (Brookings Institution,
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2004:10). In this analysis it has been assumed that every day between zero and ten
international insurgents try to enter Iraq, and that the number that succeed in entering the
country is a function of the number of Iraqi border police and coalition troops patrolling
the borders. The international insurgent rate of change is given by equation 4.26.
Eq. 4.26 InternationalInsurgentRateOfChange(t) = D1 *
BPEffectParameter(t)
(BPEffectParameter(t) + CoalitionTroopsPatrollingBorders (t ) + IraqiBP(t ))

Where
D1 ~ DiscreteUniform(0,10)

BPEffectParameter(t) = 10,000

This scenario notionally assumes that 10,000 troops patrolling Iraq’s borders will be able
to stop 50% of the international insurgents trying to enter Iraq, that 20,000 troops will be
able to stop 66% of the insurgents trying to enter Iraq, and that 30,000 troops will be able
to stop 75% of the insurgents trying to enter Iraq.
The insurgent detained or killed rate is the rate that insurgents are detained or
killed by the coalition and the Iraqi security forces. This rate is a function of the number
of insurgents in the country, the number of coalition troops and Iraqi security forces
conducting counter insurgency operations, and the number of tips the coalition receives
on insurgent activity. For each month between May 2003 and January 2004 the coalition
detained or killed between 750 and 2,000 suspected insurgents, averaging just over 1000
per month (Brookings Institution, 2004:10). It has been assumed in this scenario that
without any tips on insurgent activity each group of 30,000 troops conducting counter
insurgency operations can apprehend between 0.05% and 0.15% of the insurgents in Iraq
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each day. As there is no open source data on the effectiveness of troops at apprehending
insurgents, this number has been approximated based on assumed insurgent levels and
reported insurgent apprehensions. The insurgent apprehension rate is given by equation
4.27.
Eq. 4.27 InsurgentKilledOrDetainedRate(t) =Insurgents(t) *

CounterInsurgencyEffectParameter(t) * (CoalitionTroopsCounterInsurgency(t) +
IraqiArmyTroops(t) + ICDCTroopEffectParameter(t) * ICDCTroops) * U 1 + P1
Where

CounterInsurgencyEffectParameter(t) = 10,000
ICDCTroopEffectParameter(t) = 0.5
U 1 ~ Uniform(0.0005,0.0015)
P1 ~ Poisson(AvgApprehensionsPerTip(t) * TipsOnInsurgentActivity(t))

AvgApprehensionsPerTip(t) = 0.3

It has also been assumed that, on average, three tips in ten leads to the successful
apprehension of an insurgent. The Brookings Institution has reported that in late spring
and early summer about half of all intelligence leads were productive (2004:7). The tip
effectiveness parameter in this scenario has been chosen as a conservative estimate, as it
has been assumed that not all tips are actionable intelligence leads.
In this notional example it is assumed that of the total number of insurgents that
are killed or detained each day, zero to two percent of them are killed. The number of
insurgents killed in operations each day is given by equation 4.28.
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Eq. 4.28 InsurgentKilledRate(t) = U 1 * InsurgentKilledOrDetainedRate(t)
Where

U1 ~ Uniform(0,0.02)

The detained insurgent release rate gives the rate the detained insurgents are
released back into the pool of unemployed persons. This rate is determined directly by
the coalition, as it can decide how many detainees it will release each day. In this
scenario it is assumed that on average one out of three detainees is released each day.
The detained insurgent release rate is given by equation 4.29.
Eq. 4.29 DetainedInsurgentReleaseRate(t) ~ Poisson(DetainedInsurgentReleaseRateParameter(t) *

DetainedInsurgents(t))
Where

DetainedInsurgentReleaseRateParameter(t) = 0.33

In January 2004 U.S. troops were attacked an average of 18 times per day, Iraqi
security forces were attacked an average of 4 times per day, Iraqi civilians were attacked
an average of 1 time per day, and Iraq’s oil infrastructure was attacked twice in the whole
month (Brookings Institution, 2004:6-7). That is an average of about 23 attacks per day,
with roughly 78% of attacks being directed at U.S. troops, 17% of attacks being directed
at Iraqi security forces, 4% of attacks being directed at Iraqi civilians, and 1% of attacks
being directed at critical infrastructure. In January 2004, 14 cells, each consisting of
between 20 and 100 insurgents were believed to be operating in Baghdad, and between
3,000 and 5,000 insurgents were thought to be operating nationwide (Brookings
Institution, 2004:10). If these numbers are accurate and there were 4,000 insurgents
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operating nationwide in 100 cells of 40 insurgents each, and each cell was able to launch
an attack every 4 days there would be about 25 attacks per day in Iraq.
It is assumed in this example that insurgents organize themselves into cells of 40,
that each cell can launch an attack on average every 4 days, and that on average 78% of
attacks are directed at coalition troops, 17% of attacks are directed at Iraqi security forces,
4% of attacks are directed at Iraqi civilians, and 1% of attacks are directed at critical
infrastructure. Based on these assumptions the daily insurgent attack rates on coalition
troops, Iraqi security forces, Iraqi civilians, and critical infrastructure are given by
equations 4.30, 4.31, 4.32, and 4.33 respectively.
Eq. 4.30 InsurgentAttacksOnCoaltion(t) ~ Poisson(%OfAttacksOnCoalition(t)
*

Insurgents (t )
*AttacksPerDayPerCell(t))
InsurgentsPerCell (t )

Where

%OfAttacksOnCoalition(t) = 0.78
InsurgentsPerCell(t) = 40
AttacksPerCellPerDay(t) = 0.25

Eq. 4.31 InsurgentAttacksOnIraqiSF(t) ~ Poisson(%OfAttacksOnIraqiSF(t)
*

Insurgents (t )
*AttacksPerDayPerCell(t))
InsurgentsPerCell (t )

Where

%OfAttacksOnIraqiSF(t) = 0.17
InsurgentsPerCell(t) = 40
AttacksPerCellPerDay(t) = 0.25
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Eq. 4.32 InsurgentAttacksCivilians(t) ~ Poisson(%OfAttacksOnCiv(t)
*

Insurgents (t )
* AttacksPerDayPerCell(t))
InsurgentsPerCell (t )

Where

%OfAttacksOnCiv(t) = 0.04
InsurgentsPerCell(t) = 40
AttacksPerCellPerDay(t) = 0.25
Eq. 4.33 InsurgentAttacksInfrastructure(t) =
P1 *

FPSEffectParameter(t )
FPSEffectParameter(t ) + FPSLevel(t )

Where
P1 ~ Poisson(%OfAttacksOnInf(t) *

Insurgents (t )
*AttacksPerDayPerCell(t))
InsurgentsPerCell (t )

%OfAttacksOnInf(t) = 0.01
InsurgentsPerCell(t) = 40
AttacksPerCellPerDay(t) = 0.25
FPSEffectParameter(t) = 20,000

The additional term in equation 4.33 represents the effect the Facility Protection Service
troops have on foiling attacks on infrastructure targets. This equation assumes that
20,000 FPS troops could foil about 50% of infrastructure attacks and the coalition’s goal
of 50,000 FPS troops could foil almost 75% of all infrastructure attacks (Brookings
Institution, 2004:11).
Iraqi Labor Market

In this example it has been assumed that every member of Iraq’s labor force
belongs to one of ten groups. Each person is either (1) unemployed; (2) employed in the
private sector; employed as a trainee or active duty member of the (3) Iraqi police, (4)
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border police, (5) civil defense corps, (6) facility protection service, or (7) Iraqi Army;
employed in a (8) non-security related government job; (9) a criminal; or an (10)
insurgent. Each person in the labor market is assumed to belong to one and only one of
these categories. However, as the scenario evolves over time, people move from one
category to another as prescribed by the various rates of change.
The previous explanation of the Iraqi security institutions sub-model detailed how
people move back and forth between unemployed status and trainee and active duty
status in the Iraqi Border Police, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, the Facility Protection
Service, and the Iraqi Army. The discussion of the law enforcement sub-model explained
how people transition between unemployed status and criminal status, as well as Iraqi
police officer trainee status and active duty Iraqi police officer status. The presentation
of the coalition military and insurgent activities sub-model outlined how people transition
between unemployed status and insurgent status. The only aspects of the labor market
that have not yet been discussed are the effects of non-security related government jobs,
private sector jobs, and the per capita gross domestic product.
The detailed dynamics of the standing up the new Iraqi government is beyond the
scope of this model, and is left as an area for further research. However, its direct effect
with respect to the establishment of security is accounted for as a source of jobs. The rate
at which unemployed Iraqis are hired into government jobs is considered exogenous to
the model and set directly by the modeler as the coalition can decide how many jobs it
wishes to offer. This example assumes that the initial Iraqi government has about as
many non-security related personnel as it has security related personnel. The coalition’s
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stated goal is to train about 225,000 personnel in Iraqi security forces (Brookings
Institution, 2004:10). If the non-security related civil service is to be of about the same
size and stood up over the course of 18 months, then the government will hire on average
about 410 workers a day. This example assumes that on average 410 qualified workers
can be enticed to take a government job each day. The hiring rate of the non-security
related civil service is given by equation 4.34.
Eq. 4.34 Non-SecurityGovernmentRate(t) ~ Poisson(AvgGovtHireRate(t))
Where

AvgGovtHireRate(t) = 410

In this analysis the growth in the number of private sector jobs is a function of the
growth rate of the Iraqi gross domestic product. The relationship between the rate of
change of unemployment in a country and its growth rate of gross domestic product is
often referred to as Okun’s law (Blanchard, 2000:25). In the United States since 1960 a
drop in the unemployment rate of about one percentage point has been associated with
each 2.5 percent increase in the annualized GDP growth rate (Blanchard, 2000:26).
Despite being termed a “law,” this relationship is an empirical rule, more a “rule of
thumb,” than a binding fact of economics. However, it makes sense that such a
relationship should exist; “High output growth leads to high employment growth, as
firms hire more workers to produce more, and high employment growth leads to a
decrease in unemployment” (Blanchard, 2000:25). For this scenario it is assumed that
every day for each increase of 1% in the GDP growth rate the number of private sector
jobs will increase by one tenth of one percent, and for each decrease of 1% in the GDP
growth rate the number of private sector jobs will decrease by one tenth of one percent.

89

The daily rate of change of the number of private sector jobs in the economy is given by
equation 4.35.
Eq. 4.35 PrivateSectorHireRate(t) = (GDPGrowthEffectParameter(t) * PerCapGDPGrowth(t) *

PrivateSectorJobs(t)) * T1
Where

GDPGrowthEffectParameter(t) = 0.001
T1 ~ Triangular(0.5,1,1.5)

In the scenario developed in this thesis, Iraq’s real per capita GDP growth rate is
represented as a function of civil unrest, captured through the number of insurgent attacks
and the crime rate, and the critical infrastructure levels. According to Dalgaard and
Hansen in their paper “On Aid, Growth and Good Policies” other influential factors that
contribute to a country’s post-conflict economic growth rate include the country’s
amount of ethnic fractionalization, the quality of its institutions, the level of its financial
market development, its economic policy, and the amount of international aid it receives.
These factors are all assumed to be constant throughout the course of this example
simulation, and as a result are not modeled dynamically. Clearly, an area for further
research would be to expand the economic portion of this model by allowing these factors
to evolve dynamically. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has forecasted a per
capita GDP growth rate of 26% for Iraq in 2004, although qualifies this proposed growth
rate as conditional on the security situation in Iraq improving and meeting its
assumptions about oil and power production (International Monetary Fund, 2003:22).
For this analysis the International Monetary Fund’s estimate of a 26% GDP
growth rate has been used as a baseline estimate for Iraq’s economic growth rate. This
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baseline growth rate is then adjusted according to the number of crime related deaths that
take place and by the amount that Iraq’s oil production differs from the IMF’s estimate.
The daily per capita GDP growth rate is given by equation 4.36.
Eq. 4.36 PerCapGDPRate(t) = BaselineGD PGrowthRat e(t ) * PerCapGDPLevel(t) –
365

CrimeRelatedDeathEffectParameter(t)* (CrimeRelatedDeaths(t)) –
( PriceOfABarrelOfOil(t)*(AssumedBPDOilProduced(t) –

DailyOilDelivered(t)))/IraqiPopulation(t)
Where

CrimeRelatedDeathEffectParameter(t) = 0.000228
PriceOfABarrelOfOil(t) = 20.50
AssumedBPDOilProduced(t) = 2,000,000
IraqiPopulation(t)=25,000,000

Equation 4.36 calculates the daily growth rate of per capita GDP as the IMF’s baseline
estimate minus 0.0228% of GDP growth for every related death and $20.50 per barrel of
oil short of the IMF’s assumed level of 2,000,000 barrels of oil produced per day. These
parameters are notional and further research needs to be done to investigate their validity.
Critical Infrastructure

The three critical infrastructures in Iraq that are included in this scenario are: (1)
the water distribution infrastructure, (2) the electricity distribution infrastructure and (3)
the oil production infrastructure. While there are other important infrastructures in Iraq,
these three are considered most critical (Pollak, 2004:2). This analysis represents the
levels of these infrastructures with three variables: (1) the daily gallons of potable water
distributed, (2) the daily number of megawatt hours of electricity being delivered in Iraq,
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and (3) the number of barrels of crude oil per day produced in Iraq. For each of these
three critical infrastructures an estimate for how rapidly these infrastructures can be
developed under peaceful circumstances is used as a baseline and the number of
successful infrastructure attacks reduces and possibly reverses the development rate of
each infrastructure.
The goal of the Civilian Provisional Authority in Iraq is to increase electric
generation and distribution to 6,000 mega watts (MW) per day by the summer of 2004
(Brookings Institution, 2004:15). Achieving that level would mean a 100% increase from
the July 2003 electricity production and distribution level of just over 3,000 MW per day.
Such an increase requires an average increase of 8.2 MW per day. For this notional
analysis it is assumed that one in three insurgent attacks on infrastructure is an attack on
the electrical infrastructure, and that each successful attack reduces the daily electricity
production and distribution level between zero and ten percent. The electricity
development rate is given by equation 4.37.
Eq. 4.37 ElectricityDevelopmentRate(t) = T1 - P1 * U1 *DailyElectricDelivered(t)
Where
T1 ~Triangular(MinElectricDev(t), MedElectricDev(t), MaxElectricDev(t))

MinElectricDev(t) =4.1
MedElectricDev(t) = 8.2
MaxElectricDev(t) = 12.3
P1 ~Poisson(InsurgentInfAttackEffectParameter(t) * InsurgentInfrastructureAttacks(t))

InsurgentInfAttackEffectParameter(t) = 0.33
U1 ~ Uniform(0,0.1)
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The electricity shortage in Iraq is given by equation 4.38 where 4,400 MW was
the estimated electricity demand per day based on pre-war levels (Brookins Institution,
2004:15). The pre-war level of 4,400MW per day of electric production is used in this
equation rather than the CPA’s goal of 6,000MW per day. The electric shortage rate is
used to approximate how much electricity production is short of its typical level.
Eq. 4.38 ElectricShortage(t) = ElectricDemand(t) – DailyElectricDelivered(t)
Where

ElectricDemand(t) = 4,400

The Civilian Provisional Authority’s goal for crude oil production in Iraq is three
million barrels per day by the end of 2004 (Brookings Institution, 2004:15). Achieving
this goal would require increasing crude oil production by on average about 5,000 barrels
per day from the June 2003 level of 300,000 barrels per day. This scenario assumes that
one in three infrastructure attacks is made on Iraq’s oil infrastructure and that each attack
on the oil infrastructure reduces oil production by between zero and ten percent. The
daily oil production development rate is given by equation 4.38.
Eq. 4.39 OilDevelopmentRate(t) = T1 - P1 * U1 *DailyOilDelivered(t)
Where
T1 ~Triangular(MinOilDev(t), MedOilDev(t), MaxOilDev(t))

MinOilDev(t) =2500
MedOilDev(t) = 5000
MaxOilDev(t) = 7500
P1 ~Poisson(InsurgentInfAttackEffectParameter(t) * InsurgentInfrastructureAttacks(t))

InsurgentInfAttackEffectParameter(t) = 0.33
U1 ~ Uniform(0, 0.1)
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The shortage of oil is given by equation 4.40, where 450,000 is the daily domestic
demand for barrels of crude oil in Iraq (Brookings Institution, 2004:15). 450,000 barrels
of oil per day has been used as it is the amount of crude oil consumed on average every
day in Iraq. The CPA’s goal of producing three million barrels of oil per day includes not
only oil earmarked for domestic consumption but also oil that will be sold abroad.
Eq. 4.40 OilShortage(t) = OilDemand(t) – DailyOilDelivered(t)
Where

OilDemand(t) = 450,000

As refining crude oil into various types of usable fuel requires electricity, a shortage in
electricity produces a proportional shortage in the daily amount of oil produced.
The estimated pre-war potable water supply in Iraq was 12.9 million liters per day
(Brookings Institution, 2004:16). Immediately after the war in May 2003 it was reported
that the potable water supply was four million liters per day. By the end of June it was
estimated that 13.2 million liters were available per day, and by the end of November
21.4 million liters were available per day. The improvement in potable water availability
between May and June represents an average daily gain of 300,000 liters. If it is assumed
that one third of infrastructure attacks are directed at water infrastructure, and that each
water infrastructure attack reduces water availability between zero and five percent then
the water development rate is given by equation 4.41.

94

Eq. 4.41 WaterDevelopmentRate(t) = T1 - P1 * U1 *DailyWaterDelivered(t)
Where
T1 ~Triangular(MinWaterDev(t), MedWaterDev(t), MaxWaterDev(t))

MinWaterDev(t) =150,000
MedWaterDev(t) = 300,000
MaxWaterDev(t) = 450,000
P1 ~Poisson(InsurgentInfAttackEffectParameter(t) * InsurgentInfrastructureAttacks(t))

InsurgentInfAttackEffectParameter(t) = 0.33
U1 ~ Uniform(0, 0.05)

This scenario assumes that the quantity of water demanded equals the pre-war level of
12.9 million liters of water per day. Since some water pumps are electric, a shortage of
electricity causes a proportional decrease in the level of water delivered per day. The
water shortage rate is given by equation 4.41.
Eq. 4.42 WaterShortage(t) = WaterDemand(t) – DailyWaterDelivered(t)
Where

WaterDemand(t)= 12,900,000

Iraqi Public Opinion

The public opinion sub-model influences the rest of the model in two ways. The
number of people who are dissatisfied with the occupation influences the insurgent rate of
change and the number of people who are neutral to, or satisfied with, the occupation
influences the number of tips the indigenous population gives on insurgent activities.
The public opinion rate of change has been modeled in this example as a function of
nine variables: (1) the number of unemployed people, (2) the number of employed people,
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(3) the number of crime related deaths, the shortage/surpluses of the critical resources of (4)
water, (5) oil, and (6) electricity, and the delivered amounts of (7) water, (8) oil, and (9)
electricity. The public opinion rate of change is given by equations 4.43a through 4.43c.
Eq. 4.43a DissatisfactionPoints(t) = UnemploymentEffectParameter(t)*UnemployedPersons(t) +

CrimeRelatedDeathRateEffectParameter(t)*CrimeRelatedDeathRate(t)+
WaterDeliveredEffectParameter(t)*WaterShortageRate(t) +
ElectricityDeliveredEffectParameter(t)*ElectricShortageRate(t) +
OilDeliveredEffectParameter(t)*OilShortageRate(t)
Eq. 4.43b SatisfactionPoints(t) = EmploymentEffectParameter(t)*EmployedPersons(t) +

WaterDeliveredEffectParameter(t)*DailyWaterDelivered(t) +
ElectricityDeliveredEffectParameter(t)*DailyElectricityDelivered(t) +
OilDeliveredEffectParameter(t)*DailyOilDelivered(t)
Eq. 4.43c If DissatisfactionPoints(t) > SatisfactionPoints(t) Then

PublicOpinionRateOfChange(t) = ( ( ( SatisfactionPoints(t) /DissatisfactionPoints(t) ) -1)
* SatisfiedPeople(t) ) / PublicOpinionResponsivenessParameter(t)
Else If SatisfactionPoints(t) ≥ DissatisfactionPoints(t) Then

PublicOpinionRateOfChange(t) = - ( ( ( DissatisfactionPoints(t) / SatisfactionPoints(t) ) -1)
* DissatisfiedPeople(t) ) / PublicOpinionResponsivenessParameter(t)
Where

UnemploymentEffectParameter(t) = 1
EmploymentEffectParameter(t) = 1
CrimeRelatedDeathRateEffectParameter(t) = 30,000
WaterDeliveredEffectParameter(t) = 0.5
ElectricityDeliveredEffectParameter(t) = 1445
OilDeliveredEffectParameter(t) = 14.44
PublicOpinionResponsivenessParameter(t) = 90
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The dissatisfaction points approximates the gross number of people who have
cause to be dissatisfied and the satisfaction points approximate the gross number of
people who have cause to be satisfied. The daily rate of change of public opinion is a
function of the ratio of these two numbers and the number of people who are currently
satisfied and dissatisfied.
This example assumes that every day on average one in every 50,000 Iraqis who
are neutral to or satisfied with the occupation per 10,000 insurgents will give the coalition
a useful tip on insurgent activity, and that the average number of tips on insurgent activity
will not exceed 1,000 per day. The number of tips given by Iraqis on insurgent activity is
given by equation 4.44.
Eq. 4.44 TipsOnInsurgentActivities(t) ~
Poisson( Insurgents(t) * SatisfiedIraqis(t) * TipRateParameter(t) )
Where

TipRateParameter(t) = 1 / 500,000,000
Insurgents(t) * SatisfiedIraqis(t) * TipRateParameter(t) ≤ 1,000

Other possible expansions, while not included in this “first-cut” model include the
effects of the media, availability of schools, and other such factors. While the example
provided is limited, it can be used to conduct analysis and illustrate the potential strength
of this approach. The following screening experiment provides that illustration.
Screening Experiment

A system dynamics model like the one presented in this chapter could be
employed to provide insight to a decision maker about the principle drivers to the
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establishment of security in post-conflict reconstruction. Such information would help
decision makers effectively allocate their limited resources of money and manpower.
In order to identify the principle drivers of security in the notional scenario
detailed in this chapter, a screening experiment was designed to test the effects of various
parameters in the model. In this experiment, seven parameters were selected as factors of
interest. While others could have been selected, these were chosen to illustrate how key
drivers can be identified with a screening experiment. These parameters are: (1) the
initial percentage of the population who is dissatisfied with the occupation, (2) the initial
number of police officers, (3) the initial number of criminals, (4) the initial number of
insurgents, (5) the baseline gross domestic product growth rate, (6) the training class
sizes of the Iraqi security forces, and (7) the baseline infrastructure development rate.
The number of days from the start of the post-conflict reconstruction until security
was established was selected as the criteria for measuring the effects of these factors of
interest. For this experiment, security was said to have been established when the
average number of deaths as a result of criminal and insurgent activity fell below a
specified level for 30 days. Washington DC has an annual murder rate of 43 per 100,000
citizens which was used as a stopping criterion for this model (Brookings Institution,
2004:12). When the 30 day moving average of deaths as a result of criminal and
insurgent activity falls below this rate, security is said to be established and the
simulation is stopped.
Three replications of a seven factor one-half fractional factorial design (27-1) were
chosen for the screening experiment. This experiment varied each of the seven factors of
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interest between a low value and a high value, and recorded the output value. This is a
resolution VII design which enables one, two, and three factor interactions to be tested
without the complications of lower order aliasing (Meyers and Montgomery, 2002:157).
In the experiment the low value of the initial percentage of the population that
was dissatisfied with the occupation was set at 30%. This number was chosen to reflect
the results of a State Department survey of Iraqis in November 2003. In that survey 71%
of respondents are reported to have said that they would feel less safe if the coalition left
Iraq immediately (Brookings Institution, 2004:18). The high value was arbitrarily set at a
dissatisfaction level of 60%, so that the effects of a high dissatisfaction level could be
explored.
The low value of initial police officers was set at 10,000 to reflect the initial
amount of police officers there were in Iraq in May 2003, at the beginning of the
occupation. The Brookings Institution reports that in May 2003 there were between
7,000 and 9,000 police officers in Iraq (2004:11). The high value was set at 30,000 so
that the effect of an additional 20,000 police officers could be evaluated.
The initial number of criminals was set at a low value of 50,000 and a high value
of 100,000. There is little data on the number of criminals there were in Iraq in May
2003, so in this notional example the high value was set at twice the level of the low
value enabling the effect of the initial number of criminals on the number of days until
security is established to be tested.
The low value of the baseline GDP growth rate was set at 26%. This value
reflects the International Monetary Fund’s forecast of the growth rate of Iraq’s economy
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in 2004 (International Monetary Fund, 2003:22). The high value was set at twice the low
value to reflect an even more optimistic economic growth rate.
The low value of the training class sizes for the Iraqi security forces were set at
the levels previously identified in this chapter. The high values were set at twice the low
values to enable the effects that faster training has on establishing security to be tested.
The low value of the baseline infrastructure development rate was set at the levels
previously identified in the Critical Infrastructure section of this chapter. The high levels
were set at twice that to enable the effects that faster infrastructure development has on
establishing security to be tested. The high and low factor levels are summarized in table
4.2.
Table 4.2: Screening Experiment High and Low Factor Settings
Factor

Low

High

30%

60%

Initial Police Officers

10,000

30,000

Initial Criminals

50,000

100,000

Initial Insurgents

10,000

20,000

26%

52%

Baseline Iraqi Security Forces
Class Size

1x

2x

Baseline Critical Infrastructure
Development Rate

1x

2x

Initial Dissatisfied People

Baseline GDP Growth

100

Results

Three repetitions of each of the 64 design points were run for a total of 192
simulation runs. The output data is presented in figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Screening Experiment Output Histogram

The mean number of days until security was established for all of the simulations was
317 days with a standard deviation of 80 days given the ranges of the factors set in this
design and the functional relationships defined in this notional model.
This output data was fitted to the log-linear model expressed in equation 4.45 to
identify the one, two, and three factor effects (Neter et al., 1996:308). A is the initial
number of dissatisfied people, B is the initial number of police officers, C is the initial
number of criminals, D is the initial number of insurgents, E is the baseline GDP growth
rate, F is the class size of the Iraqi security forces, and G is the baseline infrastructure
development rate.

101

Eq 4.45 Ln Y = β 0 + ∑ β i X i + ∑ β ij X i X j +
i∈Ι

i , j∈Ι
i≠ j

∑β

i , j , k∈Ι
i≠ j, j≠k
k ≠i

ijk

Xi X j Xk +ε

Where
I = {A,B,C,D,E,F,G}
X i ≡ The level of factor i ∀i ∈ Ι

It is assumed with this model that the four, five, six, and seven factor interactions are
negligible and captured within the ε term.
The model had an R squared value of 0.98 with an F ratio of 110 indicating that it
had significantly more explanatory power than the model Ln Y = β 0 + ε . Table 4.2 lists
the estimates for the one, two, and three factor terms that were found to be significant at
the 95% level of confidence. All of the estimates for the one, two, and three factor terms
are listed in Appendix C.
Table 4.2: Significant Factor Parameter Estimates
Term

Estimate

p-value

Intercept
A: Initial Dissatisfied People
B: Initial Police Officers
C: Initial Criminals
D: Initial Insurgents
E: GDP Growth Rate
F: ISF Training Rates
G: Infrastructure Development Rate
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*E: GDP Growth Rate
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*G: Infrastructure Development Rate
C: Initial Criminals*F: ISF Training Rates
D: Initial Insurgents*G: Infrastructure Development Rate
E: GDP Growth Rate*F: ISF Training Rates
E: GDP Growth Rate*G: Infrastructure Development Rate
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*E: GDP Growth Rate*F: ISF Training Rates
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*E: GDP Growth Rate*G: Infrastructure Development Rate

5.727733
0.185359
-0.02877
0.012877
0.029326
-0.05763
-0.04549
-0.12592
0.016179
-0.02001
0.006223
-0.01114
0.010438
0.007491
-0.01065
0.00648

<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0345
0.0002
0.0005
0.0112
0.0004
0.0278

D: Initial Insurgents*E: GDP Growth Rate*F: ISF Training Rates

-0.00841

0.0046
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The factor with the largest impact on how long it takes to establish security in the
screening experiment, as seen in table 4.2, is the initial percent of the population that is
dissatisfied with the occupation. The next largest impact factor was the baseline
infrastructure development rate. The least influential factor was the initial number of
criminals.
In this notional scenario, the number of people who are initially dissatisfied with
the occupation has a significant impact on how long it takes to establish security in the
post-conflict reconstruction. While this value cannot be directly manipulated by coalition
forces once the reconstruction has begun, it may be possible to influence these conditions
by how the coalition troops conduct themselves prior to phase IV, and how rapidly they
bring civilian support programs into effect for phase IV operations. This result suggests
that efforts to win over the populace during phase I, II, and III operations, coupled with
the rapid establishment of reconstruction support, has a demonstrable effect on how much
time establishing security is likely to take.
In this notional scenario, the critical infrastructure development rate after
hostilities also had a significant impact on how quickly security was established. This
suggests that having an actionable plan in place to rapidly restore civilian utilities as soon
as the hostilities are over could reduce the amount of time it takes to establish security
and potentially save lives. While a notional example, the model does show the power of
this approach.
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Summary

In this chapter the general model developed in Chapter III is applied to a notional
scenario based on Operation Iraqi Freedom. A screening experiment is designed and
seven factors to the establishment of security are tested. Of 16 significant individual and
interaction effects, the initial amount of people who are dissatisfied with the occupation
and the rate that critical infrastructures are restored are found to have the highest impact
on how long it takes to establish security in a post-conflict reconstruction operation.
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V. Conclusions

Conclusions about the General Model and Its Application

This thesis effort developed a general model for simulating the establishment of
security in a post-conflict reconstruction. The relevant literature on post-conflict
reconstruction was reviewed and a set of level values and rates of change were identified
to begin to describe the dynamics of a post-conflict reconstruction. This general model
was then applied to a notional scenario to illustrate how such a model could be employed
to provide insight about potential policy alternatives to a decision maker. A screening
experiment was designed to identify key factors that influence how long it takes to
establish security in the notional post-conflict reconstruction scenario. The statistical
significance of these factors was tested and notional policy implications were inferred.
The runs of this notional scenario demonstrated the dynamic interactions that such a
model can simulate.
The model developed allows an analyst to take a very complex problem and gain
insight into it by dividing it into manageable component parts. This enables an analyst to
aggregate assumptions about simpler questions such as the effectiveness of troops, the
growth rate of an economy, and construction of infrastructure into an estimate for
answering more complex questions, such as, “How long will it take to establish security
in Iraq?”
The model developed in this thesis requires data on a wide range of subjects.
Data is needed on the effectiveness of troops, police officers, and other types of security
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forces. Economic data is required to model the growth of a country’s economy
dynamically. Data on the construction of infrastructure is needed, as is public opinion
data. Not all of this data is available, but the development of the general model and the
application of this model to the notional scenario highlight what data is needed. It also
identifies information needs for future post-conflict operations.
If the general model developed by this thesis were applied to a scenario using
operational data, a wide variety of potential policy alternatives could be identified and
tested. Bounds could be set on how long establishing security is likely to take, the
amount of resources needed to produce an outcome could be estimated, and assumptions
about various aspects of stability operations could be tested. The application of such a
model could help decision makers employ forces more effectively, saving money and,
more importantly, lives.

Areas for Further Research

This thesis effort is a first step at developing a comprehensive post-conflict
reconstruction model. Its greatest contribution is as a jumping off point for further
research into how to simulate post-conflict reconstruction. Besides applying the model to
operational data, one of the most promising areas for follow on research is in expanding
the general model. The general model developed in this thesis can be expanded in two
general directions: it can be expanded by increasing the model’s resolution and it can be
expanded by increasing the model’s scope.
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The general model proposed here is a high level model. It can be applied to a
scenario to infer macro level policy implications, such as how quickly police officers
need to be trained, but its resolution is insufficient to provide insight on more micro level
decisions, such as where those police officers should be deployed throughout the country.
One way to increase the resolution of this model is to include different regions of the
country as separate but interconnected parts of the whole. Different ethnic groups in
different parts of the country could be modeled individually, allowing security to be
established in the model in one or two regions of a country while other regions are still
volatile.
Another way that the resolution of this model could be increased would be by
modeling the effectiveness of different types of troops differently. For instance, a
military police officer could be modeled to be more effective in a crime suppression role
than an artillery officer in a crime suppression role. Different training programs could
also be modeled to create troops with different skill sets. An indigenous border guard
trainee who has undergone a three month training program could be modeled as being
more effective than an indigenous border guard trainee who has only undergone a week
long training program. Other effects such as equipment, experience, and the number of
translators could all be included to increase the model’s capabilities.
In addition to expanding the model’s resolution, the model’s scope could be
expanded. The model proposed by this thesis is primarily focused at simulating only one
of the four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction. The other three pillars could be
included. For instance, governance and participation could be included in the model by
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simulating the standing up of various parts of a government prior to holding elections.
The mood of the populace could be simulated dynamically and could be used to simulate
the outcome of an election. The economic aspects of the model could be expanded to
simulate the longer term recovery of a country’s economy. A larger set of infrastructures
could be included, such as communications, the media, transportation, education,
agriculture, and manufacturing.
This thesis has demonstrated the potential of this approach. History has shown that
effective post-conflict reconstruction is critical not only in the nations where conflict has
occurred, but also for long term global stability. Modeling efforts that can help decision
makers more effectively execute the re-establishment of stable nations should be perused.

108

Appendix A: General Model State Variables

BorderPatrolPersonnel – The number of active duty troops in the indigenous border

patrol.
CivilDefensePersonnel – The number of active duty troops in the indigenous civil

defense force.
IndigenousMilitaryPersonnel – The number of active duty troops in the indigenous

military.
BorderPatrolPersonnelInTraining – The number of potential indigenous border patrol

troops training to become active duty border patrol troops.
CivilDefensePersonnelInTraining – The number of potential indigenous civil defense

troops training to become active duty civil defense troops.
IndigenousMilitaryPersonnelInTraining – The number of potential indigenous military

troops training to become active duty military troops.
PoliceOfficers – The number of active duty indigenous police officers.
PoliceOfficersInTraining – The number of indigenous police officers in training.
Criminals – The number of people supporting themselves through crime.
IncarceratedCriminals – The number of criminals and suspected criminals who are being

detained awaiting trial or being jailed as part of a prison sentence.
Unemployed Persons – The number of people who want jobs who do not have them,

including people who are actively looking for a job and people who have given up
looking for a job, but still want one.
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GovernmentEmployees – The number of non-security related government employees.

PrivateSectorEmployees – The number of people employed by the private sector.
Includes people who are employed by a firm that is fulfilling a government
contract.
Insurgents – The number of people who are actively working to thwart the coalition

through violence, regardless of their motivation.
DetainedInsurgents – The number of insurgents and suspected insurgents that are being

held by the coalition.
PerCapitaGDP – The total dollar value of goods and services produced within the

country’s borders divided by the country’s population.
CoalitionMilitaryForces – The total number of coalition troops in the country.
DailyWaterDelivered – The number of gallons of potable water distributed every day in

the country.
DailyFoodDelivered – The number of tons of food distributed every day in the country.
DailyFuelDelivered – The number of gallons of fuel distributed every day in the countery.
DailyElectricityDelivered – The number of megawatts of electricity distributed every day

in the country.
DissatisfiedPeople – The number of people who are dissatisfied with the coalition.
SatisfiedPeople – The number of people who are neutral to, or satisfied with, the coalition.
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Appendix B: General Model Equations
Indigenous Security Institutions Sub-model Equations
Eq. 3.1 BPRecruitRate(t) ~ BPRRDist (µ BP Re cruitRate (t ), σ BP Re cruitRate (t ) )
Eq. 3.1a BPRecruitRate(t) ~ Poisson( λ BPRR (t ) )
Eq. 3.2 CDRecruitRate(t) ~ CDRRDist (µ CD Re cruitRate (t ), σ CD Re cruitRate (t ) )
Eq. 3.2a CDRecruitRate(t) ~ Poisson( λCDRR (t ) )
Eq. 3.3 IMRecruit Rate(t) ~ IMRRDist (µ IM Re cruitRate (t ), σ IM Re cruitRate (t ) )
Eq. 3.3a IMRecruitRate(t) ~ Poisson( λ IMRR (t ) )
Eq. 3.4 BPGradRate(t) =
⎧ BPGradClassSize(t ) * (1 − BPTrainingAttrition(t ) ) if StartDate + Classlength(t ) = CurrentDate
⎨
otherwise
⎩0
Eq. 3.5 CDGradRate(t) =
⎧CDGradClassSize(t ) * (1 − CDTrainingAttrition (t ) ) if StartDate + Classlength(t ) = CurrentDate
⎨
otherwise
⎩0
Eq. 3.6 IMGradRate(t) =
⎧ IMGradClassSize(t ) * (1 − IMTrainingAttrition(t ) ) if StartDate + Classlength(t ) = CurrentDate
⎨
otherwise
⎩0
Eq. 3.7 BPAttritionRate(t) ~ BPARDist (µ BPAttritionRate (t ), σ BPAttritionRate (t ) )
Eq. 3.8 CDAttritionRate(t) ~ CDARDist (µ CDAttritionRate (t ), σ CDAttritionRate (t ) )
Eq. 3.9 IMAttritionRate ~ IMARDist (µ IMAttritionRate (t ), σ IMAttritionRate (t ) )
Eq. 3.10 BPKIARate(t) = BPAttackEffectivenessParameter(t) * #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) *
BPCasualtyRandomVariable(t)
Eq. 3.11 CDKIARate(t) =
CDAttackEffectivenessParameter(t) * #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) * CDCasualtyRandomVariable(t)
Eq. 3.12 IMKIARate(t) =
IMAttackEffectivenessParameter(t) * #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) * IMCasualtyRandomVariable(t)
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Law Enforcement Sub-model Equations
Eq. 3.13 PORecruitRate(t) ~ PORRDist (µ PO Re cruitRate (t ), σ PO Re cruitRate (t ) )
Eq. 3.14 POGradRate(t) =
⎧ POGradClassSize(t ) * (1 − POTrainingAttrition (t ) ) if StartDate + Classlength(t ) = CurrentDate
⎨
otherwise
⎩0
Eq. 3.15 POAttritionRate(t) ~ POARDist (µ BPAttritionRate (t ), σ BPAttritionRate (t ) )
Eq. 3.16 POCasualtyRate(t) =
InsurgentAttackOnPoliceEffectParameter(t) * PoliceCasualtyRandVar(t) * #ofAttacks(t) +
PoliceCrimeRateEffectParameter(t) * PoliceCasualtyRandVar(t) * CrimeRate(t)
Eq. 3.17 CriminalRecruitRate(t) = CriminalRecruitRateInterceptParameter(t) +
UnemploymentEffectParameter(t) * UnemploymentLevel(t) +
CriminalApprehensionRateEffectParameter(t) * CriminalApprehensionRate(t) +
CriminalRecruitRateDist (µ C Re cruitRate (t ), σ C Re cruitRate (t ) )
Eq. 3.18 CriminalApprehensionRate(t) = Criminals * (PoliceEffectParameter(t) * PoliceOfficers(t) +
CivilDefenseTroopEffectParameter(t) * CivilDefenceTroops(t) + CMilitaryEffectParameter(t) *
CMilitaryPolicing(t)) * CriminalApprehensionRateRandVar(t)
Eq. 3.19 IncarceratedCriminalReleaseRate(t) = IncarceratedCriminal(t) *
IncarceratedCriminalsReleaseRandVar(t)
Eq. 3.20 CrimeRate(t) = CrimeRateRandVar(t) * (Criminals(t) * CrimesPerCriminal(t) +
Insurgents(t) * CrimesPerInsurgent(t))
Eq. 3.21 CoaltionTroopsPolicing(t) = TotalCoaltionTroops(t) * %CoalitionPolicing(t)

Insurgent and Coalition Military Activities Equations
Eq. 3.22 CoalitionTroopsInCountryRate(t) = CoalitionTroopCasualtyRate(t)
Eq. 3.23 CoalitionTroopCasualtyRate(t) = InsurgentAttackOnCoalitionEffectParameter(t) * #ofAttacks(t) *
CTCasualtyRandVar(t)
Eq. 3.24 #CoalitionPatrolingBorders(t) = TotalCoaltionTroops(t) * %CoalitionPatrollingBorders(t)
Eq. 3.25 #CoalitionCounterInsurgency(t) = TotalCoalitionTroops(t) * %CounterInsurgency(t)
Eq. 3.26 InsurgentRateOfChange(t) =DissatisfiedPeople(t) *
InsurgentKilledorDetainedEffectParameter(t) * InsurgentKilledOrDetainedRate(t) *
InsurgentRateOfChangeRandVar(t)
Eq. 3.27 InternationalInsurgentRate(t) = TotalInternationalInsurgentsRandVar(t) *
(BorderPatrolEffectParameter(t) * BorderPatrolTroops(t) +
CoalitionPatrollingBorderEffectParameter(t) * CoalitionPatrollingBorder(t))
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Eq. 3.28 InsurgentKilledOrDetainedRate(t) =
Insurgents(t) * (CTroopsCounterInsurgEffectParameter(t) * CTroopsInCounterInsurg(t) +
IMEffectParameter(t) * IndigenousMilitaryTroops(t) + CDEffectParameter(t) *
CivilDefenseTroops(t)) * TipsOnInsurgency(t) * InsurgentAppRandVar(t)
Eq. 3.28a InsurgentDetentionRate(t) = (1-InsurgentKilledRate(t)) * InsurgentKilledOrDetainedRate(t)
Eq. 3.29 InsurgentReleaseRate(t) = DetainedInsurgents(t) * InsurgentReleaseRandVar(t)
Eq. 3.30 #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) = Insurgents(t) * InsurgentEffectParameter(t) *
InsurgentAttackRandVar(t)
Eq. 3.31 #OfInfrastructureAttacks(t) = #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) * CDEffectParameter(t)
* %OfAttacksOnInfrastructure(t)

Labor Market Sub-model Equations
Eq. 3.32 GovernmentHireRate(t) ~ GHRDist (µ GovtHireRate (t ), σ GovtHireRate (t ) )
Eq. 3.32a GovernmentHireRate ~ Poisson( λGovtHireRate (t ) )
Eq. 3.33 PrivateSectorHireRate(t) = RPerCapGDPGrowth(t) * RPerCapGDPEffectParameter(t)
* PrivateSectorHireRateRandVar(t)
Eq. 3.34 PerCapRGDPGrowthRate(t) = RGDPRandVar(t) * (InsurgentAttacksEffectParameter(t) *
#OfInsurgentAttacks(t) + CrimeEffectParameter(t) * CrimeRate(t) + WaterEffectParameter(t) *
WaterShortage(t) + FoodEffectParameter(t) * FoodShortage(t) + FuelEffectParameter(t)*
FuelShortage(t) + ElectricityEffectParameter(t) * ElectricityShortage(t) +
PreviousPerCapRGDPEffectParameter(t) * PreviousPerCapRGDP(t))

Critical Infrastructure Sub-model Equations
Eq. 3.35 WaterShortage/Surplus(t) = GallonsOfWaterDelivered(t) – GallonsOfWaterDemanded(t)
Eq. 3.36 FoodShortage/Surplus(t) = TonsOfFoodDelivered(t) - TonsOfFoodDemanded(t)
Eq. 3.37 FuelShortage/Surplus(t) = GallonsOfFuelDelivered(t) - GallonsOfFuelDemanded(t)
Eq. 3.38 ElectricityShortage/Surplus(t) = MegaWattDelivered(t) – MegaWattDemanded(t)
Eq. 3.39 WaterDevelopmentRate(t) = BaseWaterDevelopmentRate(t) *
(InfrastructureAttackWaterEffectParameter(t) * #OfInfrastructureAttacks(t) +
ElectricShortageEffectParameter(t) * ElectricShortage(t))
Eq. 3.40 FoodDevelopmentRate(t) = BaseFoodDevelopmentRate(t) *
(InfrastructureAttackFoodEffectParameter(t) * #OfInfrastructureAttacks(t) +
FuelShortageEffectParameter(t) * FuelShortage(t))
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Eq. 3.41 FuelDevelopmentRate(t) = BaseFuelDevelopmentRate(t) *
(InfrastructureAttackFuelEffectParameter(t) * #OfInfrastructureAttacks(t) +
ElectricShortageEffectParameter(t) * ElectricShortage(t))
Eq. 3.42 ElectricDevelopmentRate = BaseElectricDevelopmentRate(t) *
InfrastructureAttackElectricEffectParameter(t) * #OfInfrastructureAttacks(t)

Public Opinion Sub-model Equations
Eq. 3.43 PublicOpinionRateOfChange(t) = UnemploymentEffectParameter(t)*
UnemploymentLevel(t) + InsurgentAttacksEffectParameter(t) * InsurgentAttacks(t) +
CrimeRateEffectParameter(t) * CrimeRate(t) +
WaterShortage/SurplusEffectParameter(t) * WaterShortage/Surplus(t) +
FoodShortage/SurplusEffectParameter(t) * FoodShortage/Surplus(t) +
FuelShortage/SurplusEffectParameter(t) * FuelShortage/Surplus(t) +
ElectricShortage/SurplusEffectParameter(t) * ElectricShortage/Surplus(t)
Eq. 3.44 TipsOnInsurgents(t) = #OfPeopleSatisfiedWithOccupation(t) * TipsRandomVariable(t)
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Appendix C: Two and Three Factor Parameter Estimates

Table C.1: Single Factor Parameter Estimates and Significance
Term

Estimate

p-value

Intercept
A: Initial Dissatisfied People
B: Initial Police Officers
C: Initial Criminals
D: Initial Insurgents
E: GDP Growth Rate
F: ISF Training Rates
G: Infrastructure Development Rate

5.727733
0.185359
-0.02877
0.012877
0.029326
-0.05763
-0.04549
-0.12592

<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001

Shaded factors are significant at the 95% level of confidence.

Table C.2: Two Factor Parameter Estimates and Significance
Term

Estimate

p-value

A: Initial Dissatisfied People*B: Initial Police Officers
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*C: Initial Criminals
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*D: Initial Insurgents
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*E: GDP Growth Rate
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*F: ISF Training Rates
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*G: Infrastructure Development Rate
B: Initial Police Officers*C: Initial Criminals
B: Initial Police Officers*D: Initial Insurgents
B: Initial Police Officers*E: GDP Growth Rate
B: Initial Police Officers*F: ISF Training Rates
B: Initial Police Officers*G: Infrastructure Development Rate
C: Initial Criminals*D: Initial Insurgents
C: Initial Criminals*E: GDP Growth Rate
C: Initial Criminals*F: ISF Training Rates
C: Initial Criminals*G: Infrastructure Development Rate
D: Initial Insurgents*E: GDP Growth Rate
D: Initial Insurgents*F: ISF Training Rates
D: Initial Insurgents*G: Infrastructure Development Rate
E: GDP Growth Rate*F: ISF Training Rates
E: GDP Growth Rate*G: Infrastructure Development Rate

0.003908
-0.00541
0.002469
0.016179
0.000251
-0.02001
-0.00201
-0.00047
0.003946
0.005155
0.001259
-0.00314
-0.00256
0.006223
0.00263
-0.00428
-0.0001
-0.01114
0.010438
0.007491

0.182
0.0655
0.3981
<.0001
0.9315
<.0001
0.4913
0.8733
0.1779
0.0791
0.6661
0.2823
0.3804
0.0345
0.3682
0.1439
0.9722
0.0002
0.0005
0.0112

F: ISF Training Rates*G: Infrastructure Development Rate

0.004346

0.138

Shaded factors are significant at the 95% level of confidence.

115

Table C.3: Three Factor Parameter Estimates and Significance
Term

Estimate

p-value

A: Initial Dissatisfied People*B: Initial Police Officers*C: Initial Criminals
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*B: Initial Police Officers*D: Initial Insurgents
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*B: Initial Police Officers*E: GDP Growth Rate
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*B: Initial Police Officers*F: ISF Training Rates
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*B: Initial Police Officers*G: Infrastructure Development Rate
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*C: Initial Criminals*D: Initial Insurgents
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*C: Initial Criminals*E: GDP Growth Rate
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*C: Initial Criminals*F: ISF Training Rates
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*C: Initial Criminals*G: Infrastructure Development Rate
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*D: Initial Insurgents*E: GDP Growth Rate
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*D: Initial Insurgents*F: ISF Training Rates
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*D: Initial Insurgents*G: Infrastructure Development Rate
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*E: GDP Growth Rate*F: ISF Training Rates
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*E: GDP Growth Rate*G: Infrastructure Development Rate
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*F: ISF Training Rates*G: Infrastructure Development Rate
B: Initial Police Officers*C: Initial Criminals*D: Initial Insurgents
B: Initial Police Officers*C: Initial Criminals*E: GDP Growth Rate
B: Initial Police Officers*C: Initial Criminals*F: ISF Training Rates
B: Initial Police Officers*C: Initial Criminals*G: Infrastructure Development Rate
B: Initial Police Officers*D: Initial Insurgents*E: GDP Growth Rate
B: Initial Police Officers*D: Initial Insurgents*F: ISF Training Rates
B: Initial Police Officers*D: Initial Insurgents*G: Infrastructure Development Rate
B: Initial Police Officers*E: GDP Growth Rate*F: ISF Training Rates
B: Initial Police Officers*E: GDP Growth Rate*G: Infrastructure Development Rate
B: Initial Police Officers*F: ISF Training Rates*G: Infrastructure Development Rate
C: Initial Criminals*D: Initial Insurgents*E: GDP Growth Rate
C: Initial Criminals*D: Initial Insurgents*F: ISF Training Rates
C: Initial Criminals*D: Initial Insurgents*G: Infrastructure Development Rate
C: Initial Criminals*E: GDP Growth Rate*F: ISF Training Rates
C: Initial Criminals*E: GDP Growth Rate*G: Infrastructure Development Rate
C: Initial Criminals*F: ISF Training Rates*G: Infrastructure Development Rate
D: Initial Insurgents*E: GDP Growth Rate*F: ISF Training Rates
D: Initial Insurgents*E: GDP Growth Rate*G: Infrastructure Development Rate
D: Initial Insurgents*F: ISF Training Rates*G: Infrastructure Development Rate

-0.00144
0.000594
-0.00301
-0.00216
-0.00155
0.001971
0.000397
-0.001
0.002418
-0.00188
-0.00151
0.002064
-0.01065
0.00648
0.005181
0.001102
-0.00397
0.001538
0.001823
-0.00075
-0.0016
0.002461
0.001812
0.000838
-0.00048
0.000381
-0.00445
0.001971
0.001768
0.005516
-0.00073
-0.00841
0.005431
-0.00054

0.6229
0.8386
0.3032
0.4597
0.5961
0.4998
0.8918
0.7315
0.408
0.5209
0.6054
0.4797
0.0004
0.0278
0.0776
0.7059
0.1755
0.5983
0.5323
0.7985
0.5845
0.3997
0.5349
0.774
0.8703
0.8962
0.129
0.4997
0.5449
0.0605
0.8032
0.0046
0.0645
0.8533

E: GDP Growth Rate*F: ISF Training Rates*G: Infrastructure Development Rate

0.00354

0.2264

Shaded factors are significant at the 95% level of confidence.
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